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LIABILITY FOR "KNOWING" TRANSMISSION OF HIV:
THE EVOLUTION OF A DUTY TO DISCLOSE
JODY B. GABEL*
I. INTRODUCTION
THE advent of Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS) over
a decade ago brought fear to a small segment of the United States
population. Initially diagnosed in two specific risk groups, male homo-
sexuals and intravenous drug users,' AIDS is now the third leading
cause of death in men and women between the ages of twenty-five and
forty-four in this country.2 Two reports from the Centers for Disease
Control (CDC) evidence the pervasive spread of AIDS in the United
States: by 1987, the CDC reported 28,098 cumulative cases of AIDS;
3
using the same reporting methods through January 1992, the number of
reported AIDS cases had increased to 209,693.4 The severity of AIDS,
which is currently both incurable and fatal, combined with the fact that
it is primarily transmitted through volitional conduct, has caused fear
* Prior to attending law school, the author worked as a registered respiratory therapist
for thirteen years and as a licensed respiratory care practitioner in the State of Florida.
1. Eileen Keerdoja, 'Homosexual Plague' Strikes New Victims, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 23,
1982, at 10 (reporting that a "mysterious and deadly illness" had begun to develop in male
homosexuals); see also Matt Clark et al., AIDS: A Lethal Mystery Story, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 27,
1982, at 63 (describing the initial prevalence of AIDS in homosexuals and heroin addicts).
2. SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORTTO tE AMERIcAN PUBLIC ON HIV INFECTION AND AIDS, 1
(1993) [hereinafter 1993 SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT] ("AIDS is already a leading killer of men
and women 15 to 44 years old in our country"); AIDS Deaths Increase Disease Spreading
Among Those 15-44, FT. LAUDERDALE SUN-SENTINEL, June 11, 1993, at 10A (Bill Grigg, a
spokesperson for the U.S. Public Health Service, reported that AIDS, cancer and heart disease
are the leading causes of death in this age group.).
3. Update: Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome-United States, 35 MORBIDITY & MOR-
TAIITY WEEKLY REP. No. 49, 757 (Dec. 12, 1986) (Table I showing cumulative cases of AIDS
reported in the United States through Dec. 6, 1986).
4. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, HIV/AIDS SURVEILLANCE 1, 5 (Feb. 1992)(Table I de-
picting cumulative AIDS cases in all 50 states, the District of Columbia, and four U.S. Territo-
ries). In January 1992 the CDC also reported that the second 100,000 cases of AIDS occurred
within 26 months, whereas eight years transpired before the first 100,000 cases were reported in
the United States. AIDS Epidemic Rapidly Hits 200,000 Cases, FT. LAUDERDALE SUN SENTINEL,
Jan. 17, 1992, at 3A.
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and often irrational proposals for containing this modern epidemic.'
AIDS-related litigation also has escalated in the United States. Approxi-
mately thirty criminal and civil cases were filed by 1987 that charged the
intentional or knowing transmission of the human immunodeficiency
virus (HIV), the retrovirus which ultimately causes AIDS.6 By Septem-
ber 1991, this number had increased to 840 AIDS-related cases nation-
wide.7 Prosecutions occur on traditional grounds, such as attempted
murder and assault with a deadly weapon.9 In addition, civil litigation
occurs under specialized state statutes that prohibit knowing exposure
or transmission of HIV to another person.10 The cases reviewed in this
Comment involve a minuscule portion of HIV-positive individuals who
continue to engage in behavior that is recognized as a mode of HIV
transmission. 1"
5. Examples of the general public's irrational fear of contracting HIV or AIDS abound in
newspapers across the United States. In 1988, the Texas Association of Realtors "told its mem-
bers that occupancy by an AIDS patient could be viewed by some buyers as a defect in the
house, much like a bad roof or the presence of radon gas." Peter Applebome, AIDS, Like a
Roof, Is Realtors' Concern, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1988, at A14. Misconceptions often mutate
into unreasonable suggestions that attract public attention and support, as evidenced in an edito-
rial written by William F. Buckley in 1986. William F. Buckley Jr., Crucial Steps in Combatting
the AIDS Epidemic; Identify All the Carriers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1986, at A27. To contain
the spread of AIDS, Buckley suggested tattooing all individuals with AIDS to warn other people
of their infliction. Id. "Everyone detected with AIDS should be tattooed in the upper forearm to
protect common-needle users, and on the buttocks, to prevent the victimization of other homo-
sexuals." Id. As incredulous as this editorial appeared, a limited survey of Florida residents in
1992 revealed that 82% of the people polled believed HIV-positive individuals "should carry
identification." Seth Borenstein, Poll Shows 4 in 5 Support IDs on Those Carrying HIV, FT.
LAUDERDALE SUN SENTINEL, Oct. 28, 1992, at 6A (survey polled 1,217 randomly selected Florida
residents by telephone with a three percent margin of error). These are only a few examples of
the persistent misconceptions and apprehension exhibited by the public regarding HIV and AIDS
transmission.
6. Robert 0. Boorstinc, Criminal and Civil Litigation on Spread of AIDS Appears, N.Y.
TIMES, June 19, 1987, at AI.
7. Rorie Sherman, Criminal Prosecutions On AIDS Growing, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 14, 1991,
at 3.
8. See, e.g., Weeks v. State, 834 S.W.2d 559 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (HIV-positive defen-
dant convicted of attempted murder for spitting on prison guard).
9. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 621 A.2d 493 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993) (HlV-positive
defendant convicted of attempted murder, aggravated assault and terroristic threats for biting a
corrections officer after repeated threats to kill the officer in this manner).
10. See Louisiana AIDS Law Faces U.S. Challenge, FT. LAUDERDALE SUN SENTINEL, Nov.
18, 1992, at 5A. See infra note 179 (listing states with HIV-specialized statutes).
11. Of the estimated one million individuals infected with HIV, the number of cases involv-
ing intentional or knowing attempts to transmit HIV constitute a minute portion of this popula-
tion. See Sally Squires, Spreading AIDS on Purpose; Especially in the Military, Prosecution Is
Sought in Rare Cases, WAsH. PosT, Apr. 19, 1988, at Z6 (similar sentiments from criminal pro-
secutors advocating limited role for AIDS-related prosecution). The purpose of this Comment is
to assess those recalcitrant cases and the associated charges under which convictions occur. The
dignity of individuals who are HIV-positive or suffering from AIDS should not be maligned by
the actions of a few who exceed the normal parameters of human decency.
KNO WING TRANSMISSION OF HIV
This Comment provides an overview of HIV-related litigation in the
United States and the evolution of a duty for HIV-positive individuals
to either refrain from knowingly exposing others to the virus or to dis-
close their infection prior to engaging in risk-related conduct. Because
of the fear associated with this disease, whether justified or unreasona-
ble, it is crucial to recognize that sanctions for knowing transmission of
HIV should exist only to punish behavior that is intentional and threat-
ening to the health of another person. To knowingly place another indi-
vidual at risk of contracting HIV, without full disclosure of one's HIV-
positive status, is a reprehensible act deserving penalty or criminal sanc-
tion. '
2
This Comment initially provides a brief description of the epidemiol-
ogy, transmission and prevalence of HIV infection and AIDS to estab-
lish a context for assessing HIV-related litigation in the United States.
This Comment assesses unique military prosecutions for knowing expo-
sure or transmission of HIV under military codes and regulations; ana-
lyzes prosecutions based upon traditional criminal charges in both the
military and civilian populations; reviews the development and opera-
tion of specialized state statutes prohibiting knowing transmission of
HIV; discusses the ramifications of transmission of HIV from a Florida
dentist to his patients;'3 and proposes that a duty to disclose applies to
HIV-positive health care professionals who perform exposure-prone
procedures.
II. EPIDEMIOLOGY, TRANSMISSION, AND PREVALENCE OF HIV
INFECTION AND AIDS
An assessment of the evolution of HIV-related litigation necessitates
a basic understanding of the epidemiology and prevalence of HIV in-
12. See Mack Reed, Area Man Is Accused of Passing AIDS Virus, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 12,
1991, at BI (reporting that gay rights activists and experts in AIDS law "applauded prosecu-
tion" of a man who allegedly had repeated sex with a woman without disclosing his HIV-posi-
tive status, resulting in actual transmission of HIV to both the woman and her baby); see also
Squires, supra note 1I, at Z6 (reporting on attitudes toward criminalizing the transmission of
AIDS and only using such measures for individuals who recklessly or intentionally endanger
others by their behavior). Several psychological studies researching the issue of why some indivi-
duals continue to engage in unprotected sexual intercourse after testing positive for HIV indicate
that some "people may be overwhelmed by the raw need for sex, protected or otherwise; others
may simply become careless after awhile; still others seem to develop a malicious form of de-
pendency on their partners." Kevin Krajick, Private Passions & Public Health; For Some People
it Takes More Than an AIDS Test to Temper Fatal Attractions, PsYcnOL. TODAY, May 1988, at
50. Two psychologists at the University of California "found that one-quarter of heterosexual
and homosexual people at two test sites said they did not intend to tell casual partners if they
turned out to be infected." Id.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 219-234.
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fection and AIDS in the United States. AIDS consists of a "specific
group of diseases or conditions which are indicative of severe immuno-
suppression related to infection with the human immunodeficiency vi-
rus (HIV).' ' 4 Scientific research has continued from 1981 through
today, regarding HIV transmission and the ultimate destruction of the
body's immune system during the last stages of the infection, or "full-
blown" AIDS. The first reported cases of AIDS occurred in Los An-
geles in 1981, where five homosexual men contracted an unusual form
of infection called pneumocystis carinii pneumonia."5 In 1983, research-
ers identified the virus, subsequently named the human immunodefi-
ciency virus (HIV).16 HIV attacks the body's immune system by
adhering to a susceptible class of white blood cells, CD4 + T-lympho-
cytes, or T-cells, which normally operate to fight infection.
Upon initial infection with HIV, a person usually experiences flu-like
symptoms, such as fever, chills and general malaise. 7 During this initial
phase, 20 to 4007o of the body's T-cells die due to contact with HIV.
The immune system reacts to the presence of HIV by manufacturing
antibodies to fight the virus and replenishing the T-cells to almost nor-
mal levels. 8 This rebound of T-cells accounts for the lack of any fur-
ther signs of HIV infection beyond the typical flu or cold-like
symptoms near the time of exposure. 9 Medical research indicates that
some individuals remain HIV-positive and symptom-free for as long as
two to ten years before the virus finally destroys the immune system's
14. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, HIV/AIDS SURVEILLANCE, cover page (Feb. 1992). The
CDC recognized AIDS as a distinct disease in 1982 and adopted the acronym in place of the
former description of "Kaposi's sarcoma and opportunistic infections in previously healthy per-
sons." Update on Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS)-United States, 31 MOBID-
ITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. No. 37, 507 (Sept. 24, 1982). The CDC expanded the
surveillance definition of AIDS for 1993 to include monitoring of CD4+ T-lymphocytes levels (a
specific type of white blood cell) in the blood of HIV-infected individuals. CENTERS FOR DISEASE
CONTROL, 1993 Revised Classification System for HIV Infection and Expanded Surveillance
Case Definition for AIDS Among Adolescents and Adults, 41 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY
REP. No. RR-17 1, 4 (Dec. 18, 1992). The report indicated that depletion of CD4+ T-lympho-
cyte levels below 200 cells per microliter consistently correlated with "HIV-related immune dys-
function and disease progression." Id. at 5.
15. Pneumocystis Carinii Pneumonia-Los Angeles, 30 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY
REP. No. 21, 250 (June 5, 1981).
16. Gina Kolata, How AIDS Smolders: Immune System Studies Follow the Tracks of
H.L V., N.Y TuAEs, Mar. 17, 1992, at CI (describing three recent hypotheses explaining how the
virus lingers in the immune system for as long as ten years before it finally destroys the immune
system).
17. Id. For a detailed description of the clinical manifestations of HIV infection and subse-
quent progression to AIDS, see Abe M. Macher, HIV Disease/AIDS: Medical Background,
AIDS AND THE LAW 1, 4-17 (Wiley Law Publications Editorial Staff eds., 2d ed. 1992).
18. Kolata, supra note 16, at Cl.
19. Id.
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ability to fight infections.20 This latency period is the most dangerous
aspect of HIV infection because an infected person may be ignorant of
both the infection and the propensity to infect others.2' During the la-
tency period, the only indication that a person may be infected with
HIV is through a positive HIV test, the presence of recurrent illnesses
such as opportunistic infections, or suspicion of high risk for HIV in-
fection based upon lifestyle or risk-related conduct. 22
HIV testing is performed in a two-stage process that screens the
blood for the presence of antibodies produced as a result of exposure to
HIV. The ELISA test (enzyme-linked immunoabsorbent assay) screens
the blood and indicates a positive result when these antibodies are de-
tected. 2 Further confirmation occurs through the Western Blot test,
which detects the elevation of antibodies that combat HIV. This second
test also identifies antibodies produced in response to proteins of a spe-
cific molecular weight in the same range as HIV. Positive results on
both the ELISA and Western Blot test indicate HIV infection.
24
Current medical research indicates the existence of at least two spe-
cies of HIV, HIV-1 and HIV-2.Y Of the two, HIV-1 accounts for the
majority of infections in the United States and the world. 26 The HIV-1
strain consists of five separate families, "each differing from the others
genetically by as much as 30% and randomly scattered throughout the
world." 27 Through DNA analysis, a sample of HIV-1 from one person
20. Id.; see also Update: Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome-United States, 35 MORBID-
ITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. No. 35, 17, 29 (Jan. 17, 1986) (reporting that AIDS cases have
resulted from HIv exposure "up to seven years before diagnosis").
21. Surgeon General's Report on Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome, 256 J. Am.
Med. Assoc.. 2784 (1986) [hereinafter 186 Surgeon General's Report] (explaining that "[elven
before the antibody test is positive, the victim can pass the virus to others"); 1993 SURGEON
GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 2, at 10 (explaining that a person can "look and feel healthy,"
but still be infected with HIV).
22. See 1986 Surgeon General's Report, supra note 21, at 2784 (informing the American
public that "[alnyone who thinks he or she is infected or involved in high risk behaviors should
not donate his/her blood, organs, tissues, or sperm because they may now contain the AIDS
virus"); see also 1993 SURGEON GENERAL's REPORT, supra note 2, at 10 (providing a section
entitled "Assess Your Own Risk" with questions to evaluate the possibility of exposure to HIV
based on lifestyle or experience).
23. Donald H.J. Hermann, AIDS: Malpractice and Medical-Related Liability, 19 Hosp.
LAW 1 (Dec. 1986). The CDC recommends this two-stage testing for confirmation of a positive
ELISA test. Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection in the United States: A Review of Cur-
rent Knowledge, 36 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. SUPP., 127 (Dec. 18, 1987).
24. Hermann, supra note 23, at 1.
25. Unusual New AIDS Strain Found in Thailand, FT. LAUDERDALE SUN SENTINEL, July
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can be genetically identified and compared to the molecular structure of
HIV-1 from an alleged victim to assess the probability of transmission
from the original person.23
HIV transmission occurs through sexual contact with an infected per-
son, exposure to infected blood or blood products, and perinatally
from an infected mother to her newborn.2 9 Although HIV has been iso-
lated from saliva, tears, urine and other body fluids, "epidemiologic
evidence has implicated only blood, semen, vaginal secretions and pos-
sibly breast milk in transmission." 30 There is no medical evidence to
indicate that HIV can be transmitted by casual nonsexual contact or by
insects bites.' Furthermore, there are no documented cases of HIV
transmission through saliva in conjunction with acts of biting or spit-
ting by an infected individual. 32
Of all possible modes of transmission, sexual contact is the most
common means of exposure to HIV. s3 Homosexual contact accounts
for 56% of all reported AIDS cases.3 4 However, United States Surgeon
General Antonia Coello Novello indicated that 39% of reported AIDS
cases in women in 1992 resulted from heterosexual contact, an increase
of 42% since 1990.31 Research also indicates that male-to-female sexual
28. See David Kidwell, AIDS Dentist's Lethal Weapon? Accidental Transmission Unlikely
in Latest Case, Experts Say, MIAMI HERALD, June 6, 1993, at Al (reporting that scientists identi-
fied the sixth patient infected with a strain of HIV unique to Florida dentist David Acer through
DNA testing).
29. Macher, supra note 17, at 4-5.
30. Recommendations for Prevention of HIV Transmission in Health-Care Settings, 36
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. No. 2S, 3S (Aug. 21, 1987).
31. Hermann, supra note 23, at 5; see generally 1986 Surgeon General's Report, supra note
21, at 2784 (informing the American public of the modes of HIV transmission and preventive
measures to decrease the possibility of contracting the virus); see also 1993 SURGEON GENERAL'S
REPORT, supra note 2, at 8 (explaining that HIV is not transmitted through mosquito or other
bug bites).
32. Lawrence 0. Gostin, The Politics of AIDS: Compulsory State Powers, Public Health,
and Civil Liberties, 49 Omo ST. L.J. 1017, 1023-25 (1989) [hereinafter Gostin, The Politics of
AIDS]; see generally Alan R. Lifson, Do Alternative Modes for Transmission of Human Immu-
nodeficiency Virus Exist? A Review, 259 J. Am. Med. Assoc. 1353 (1988)(describing the results
of scientific research on additional modes of transmission and the importance of public aware-
ness about how HIV is, and is not, transmitted).
33. Hermann, supra note 23, at 4; see also Gostin, The Politics of AIDS, supra note 32, at
1021-22 (describing the risk of sexual transmission of HIV).
34. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, HIV/AIDS SURVEILLANCE 1, 15 (Feb. 1992) (Table 10
showing 5607o of 206,171 AIDS cases reported through January 1992 resulted from homosexual
exposure).
35. Paul Raeburn, Women and AIDS: U.S. Report Focuses on Dangers and Outlines Pre-
cautions, TALLAIASSEE DEMOCRAT, June il, 1993, at Al; see also 1993 SURGEON GENERAL'S
REPORT, supra note 2, at I (describing that almost "half of the cases of AIDS in women have
been reported in the last 2 years").
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transmission of HIV is more prevalent than the incidence of female-to-
male transmission.36 Regardless of the gender of the transmitting part-
ner, 11,687 people acquired AIDS through heterosexual transmission
through January 1992.17 According to statistics from the CDC, over
62% of all AIDS cases reported through January 1992 involved trans-
mission through either homosexual or heterosexual intercourse. 8
One of the most important methods for containing the spread of
HIV and AIDS is education regarding abstinence, monogamy and the
proper use of condoms.3 9 Several reports indicate that Americans still
engage in high-risk activities such as unprotected sexual intercourse or
the sharing of hypodermic needles during intravenous drug use. *4 The
1991 statistics for AIDS cases ranked Puerto Rico first in the nation
with an annual rate of AIDS cases equal to 48.40 per 100,000 popula-
tion, New York second with 450o, and Florida third with an annual
rate of 41.807.41 Due to the prevalence of AIDS, public health depart-
ments and officials occupy a critical role in reaching the American pop-
ulation and advocating preventive sexual practices and safe behavior. 2
This Comment focuses on the "knowing" transmission of HIV,
which should be reduced through education, yet somehow continues to
escalate throughout all groups in the population. The advent of crimi-
nal prosecutions for transmission or exposure to HIV, mandating a
duty to refrain from activity known to transmit the virus, has resulted
in successful criminal prosecutions of noncompliant behavior where ed-
ucation and an emphasis on social responsibility have failed. Prosecu-
tions for knowing transmission of HIV originated in the unique and
36. Gerald H. Friedland & Robert S. Klein, Transmission of the Human Immunodeficiency
Virus, 317 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1125, 1129-30 (1987).
37. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, HIV/AIDS SURVEILLANCE, 1, 15 (Feb. 1992).
38. Id.
39. Lawrence 0. Gostin, The Future of Public Health Law, 12 Am. J.L. & MED. 461, 464
(1986)(advocating a public health approach by educating individuals on the modes of transmis-
sion and specifically targeting high risk groups to alter behavior patterns).
40. See, e.g., AIDS Deaths Increase, Disease Spreading Among Those 15-44, FT. LAUDER-
DALE SUN SENTINEL, June 11, 1993, at 10A (U.S. Surgeon General, while reporting that HIV
continues to spread despite educational efforts, stated that "[floo many people continue to take
chances and too many of them become infected"); Bill Thompson, Too Many Americans Fool-
ishly Ignore AIDS Warning: 'It Can Happen to You', FT. LAUDERDALE SUN SENTINEL, Nov. 23,
1992, at 9A (according to the Associated Press, the "most extensive national sex survey in more
than 40 years reveals that 'heterosexual Americans are not taking seriously the risks of AIDS').
41. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, HIV/AIDS SURVEILLANCE, 1, 5 (Feb. 1992) (Table I
showing cumulative AIDS cases per 100,000 population reported in all fifty states, the District of
Columbia, and four U.S. territories).
42. Gostin, The Politics of AIDS, supra note 32, at 1019 (advocating public health meas-
ures such as education, counseling, and retraining human behavior to contain the spread of HIV
and AIDS).
1994]
988 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW [Vol. 21:981
disciplined environment of the United States Military, which established
the basis for similar civilian litigation.
III. UNIQUE MILITARY PROSECUTIONS FOR KNOWING TRANSMISSION OF
HIV
To assess military prosecutions, the military codes, regulations, and
medical procedures for HIV testing and counseling must be briefly de-
scribed. The Department of Defense implemented procedures for man-
datory testing of all potential recruits in 1985, which included policies
for identification, surveillance, and preventive medicine counselling of
servicemembers who tested positive for HIV .4 The standard procedure
commences with an ELISA test, and if positive, a Western Blot test for
confirmation." The medical staff then evaluates the servicemember's
medical status and provides extensive counseling about the fatality of
AIDS, the transmission of HIV through sexual acts, and the responsi-
bility to either abstain from sexual intercourse or to use condoms to
decrease the possibility of transmission.
45
A. Conviction Under Article 134:46 Acts Which Prejudice or Discredit
the Military
Generally, a military conviction occurs when an HIV-positive service-
member either had unprotected sexual intercourse or failed to disclose
his or her HIV-positive status prior to engaging in sexual conduct. The
foundation for "knowing" transmission is established through stan-
dard medical procedures that include extensive counseling regarding
HIV transmission and the responsibilities of all HIV-positive indivi-
duals. Each servicemember who receives preventive medicine counseling
must sign an informative counseling sheet that includes notification that
noncompliance may result in adverse actions or punishment.47 Prior to
1988, preventive medicine counseling did not include an order from the
servicemember's commanding officer mandating compliance with the
medical requirements. 4 However, noncompliance with the counseling
43. John A. Anderson, et al., AIDS Issues in the Military, 1990 A.F. L. REv. 353, 358-59.
44. Id. at 361.
45. Melissa Wells-Petry, Anatomy of an AIDS Case: Deadly Disease as an Aspect of
Deadly Crime, 1988 ARMy LAW. 17, 18; see also Squires, supra note 11, at Z6 (reporting that
"married couples in which only one partner is HIV positive are permitted to have unprotected
sex with each other," whereas all single individuals in the military must comply with safe sex
orders).
46. 10 U.S.C. § 934 (1983).
47. Anderson, supra note 43, at 362-63.
48. Id. at 361.
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requirements could result in discharge or criminal penalties under Arti-
cle 134 of the Military Code, also known as the General Article. 49
Prosecution under Article 134 requires a demonstration that the de-
fendant did, or failed to perform, certain acts that prejudiced or dis-
credited the Armed Forces. 0 The gravamen of a charge relating to
knowing transmission of HIV is reckless endangerment of another indi-
vidual's health. Courtmartial and criminal prosecution under Article
134 are best assessed through a brief analysis of United States v. Mor-
ris,5 the first reported military case involving charges for HIV-related
misconduct.5 2 The defendant was charged and convicted of consensual
sodomy and sexual intercourse while knowing he was HIV-positive,
thus exhibiting a wanton disregard for human life.53 On appeal, the de-
fendant asserted that he engaged in "non-deviant sexual intercourse
with a female" and could not be held liable for placing the victim at
risk because no one in authority told him such conduct would consti-
tute a violation of the military code.
4
The court stated that the defendant's "actions in willfully and delib-
erately exposing another servicemember to the risk of contracting HIV
virus certainly rises to the level of conduct that is prejudicial to good
order and discipline. 55 The court also noted that each servicemember
receives careful instructions regarding Article 134, both upon entry into
the armed forces and after six months of service.se Furthermore, the
49. 10 U.S.C. § 934 (1983); see also Wells-Petry, supra note 45, at 25-26 (describing the
general elements of Article 134 and the possibility of conviction for noncompliance with preven-
tive medicine counseling requirements).
50. United States v. Woods, 27 M.J. 749, 751 (N.M.C.M.R. 1988), aff'd, 28 M.J. 318
(C.M.A. 1989). The court cautioned that Article 134 is not a "catchall" provision to make all
irregular or improper acts the basis for court-martial. Id. at 750. However, in assessing an in-
dictment based on violations of Article 134, the court held that a criminal offense was alleged
based upon the stated facts in the case:
the accused is alleged to have engaged in unprotected sexual intercourse, knowing that
his seminal fluid contained a deadly virus capable of being transmitted by means of
sexual intercourse, that unprotected sexual intercourse was inherently dangerous to his
partner, and that the probable consequence of such act was death or great bodily
harm.
Id. at 750. The court explained that there is no requirement that the alleged misconduct be pro-
hibited by an official order or regulation for prosecution under Article 134. Id.
51. 25 M.J. 579 (A.C.M.R. 1987), aff'd, 30 M.J. 1221 (A.C.M.R. 1990).
52. Boorstinc, supra note 6, at Al (reporting that Private Morris was believed to be the first
person charged with the crime of exposing another individual to HIV during sexual intercourse).
53. United States v. Morris, 25 M.J. 579 (A.C.M.R. 1987).
54. United States v. Morris, 30 M.J. 1221, 1225 (A.C.M.R. 1990). The New York Times
reported that Morris had sexual relations "with his pregnant fiance, a male friend and another
woman from August 1986, to March 1987." Court-Martial of Soldier Is Urged for Sex After
Positive AIDS Test, N.Y. TimEs, May, 8, 1987, at B9.
55. Morris, 30 M.J. at 1225.
56. Id.
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court considered the testimony of several people at trial that established
the defendant had received counseling regarding the fatality of HIV,
understood that sexual intercourse is a common mode of transmission,
and knew that by not using condoms he increased the likelihood of
placing others at risk." All of these factors demonstrated that the de-
fendant was aware that "he had a fatal disease and that his conduct




Additionally, the defendant asserted that the female victim not only
consented to sexual intercourse, but also knew that he was infected with
HIV prior to engaging in such conduct and did not require him to wear
a condom during at least 75% of their sexual encounters. 9 The court
rejected this informed consent defense, explaining that the gravamen of
the offense was that the defendant engaged in unprotected sex knowing
that such conduct was an "inherently dangerous" act likely to produce
great bodily harm or death.6 Finally, the court emphasized that the
compelling public policy goal inherent in this case was to deter service-
members from engaging in further reckless behavior and combatting
the spread of a deadly disease, regardless of the victim's informed con-
sent .61
The decision in Morris illustrates that the duty is specifically imposed
upon the HIV-positive servicemember to use barrier protection and to
inform sexual partners of his or her HIV status. Under this factual sce-
nario, the victim's consent to sexual intercourse does not exonerate con-
duct that is performed while the defendant knows the consequences of
HIV infection and the likelihood of transmission. Under Article 134,
actual injury or transmission of HIV is not required because the offense
is based upon conduct which violates the good order and discipline of
the military. The HIV-specific statutes operate under the same public
policy principle and require the same minimal burden of proof for im-
posing liability.6 2
B. Conviction Under Article 90:63 Willful Disobedience of a "Safe-
Sex" Order
In 1988, military commanders began issuing orders to follow preven-
tive medicine counseling requirements to use condoms when engaging
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1228.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See infra notes 179-205, and accompanying text.
63. 10 U.S.C. § 890 (1983).
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in sexual intercourse and to inform any sexual partners of one's HIV-
positive status. 64 The military explanation for implementing "safe sex"
orders and disclosure requirements is provided on the top of every or-
der: "[b]ecause of the necessity to safeguard the overall health, welfare,
safety, and reputation of this command, and to ensure unit readiness
and the ability of the unit to accomplish its mission, certain behavior
and unsafe health procedures must be proscribed for members who are
diagnosed as positive for HIV infection." 65 Any servicemember who vi-
olates the order is subject to a charge of willful disobedience of a supe-
rior commissioned officer and discharge under Article 90.6
In United States v. Womack, 7 the defendant challenged the validity
of a "safe sex" order on the basis that the prohibited conduct was not
a likely mode of transmission and was therefore overly restrictive. The
defendant tested positive for HIV, received standard preventive medi-
cine counseling, and was ordered to inform all sexual partners of his
HIV status, to use condoms to protect his partners from contact with
"certain" of his bodily fluids, and to refrain from sodomy or homosex-
ual acts. "The defendant proceeded to perform non-consensual fellatio
on an inebriated airman, resulting in charges of forceful sodomy and
willful disobedience of his commanding officer's order. 0
The court assessed the requirements of the safe sex order and con-
cluded that the duty to disclose one's HIV-positive status to present and
future sexual partners, and to refrain from homosexual activity, were
reasonable requirements aimed at minimizing the spread of HIV and
AIDS.7' The court then addressed the portion of the order which im-
posed an affirmative duty upon the defendant to take measures during
sexual activity to protect partners from exposure to his blood, semen,
urine, feces, or saliva.72 Under the facts presented, the potential trans-
mission agent was saliva.73 Even though medical expert testimony estab-
lished that no reported case showed that HIV was transmitted through
saliva, the court stated that the testimony demonstrated the possibility
of transmission through either a break in the skin of the victim's penis
or bleeding gum disease in the defendant.7 4 These findings provided a
64. Anderson, supra note 43, at 362-63, n.75.
65. Id.
66. 10 U.S.C. § 890 (1983).
67. 27 M.J. 630 (A.F.C.M.R. 1988), aff'd, 29 M.J. 88 (C.M.A. 1989).
68. Id. at 633.
69. Id. at 631-32.
70. Id. at 632.
71. Id. at 633-35.
72. Id. at 633-34.
73. Id. at 634.
74. Id.
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rational basis for the order to include saliva as a transmission fluid.75 In
affirming the defendant's conviction, the court held that all aspects of
the safe sex order constituted a "lawful exercise of command author-
ity. '17 The court's decision in Womack demonstrates that the burden of
proof required to establish both intent and the possibility of HIV trans-
mission is also minimal under Article 90.
77
An HIV-positive servicemember can also be convicted of willful diso-
bedience of a safe sex order when a condom is used during sexual inter-
course, but the partner is not informed of his or her HIV infection. In
United States v. Negron, 7  the defendant was convicted of willful diso-
bedience of a lawful order ii violation of Article 90,79 and sentenced to
a dishonorable discharge, forfeiture of pay for six months, and reduc-
tion to private first-class.w0 Upon notification of his HIV-positive
status, the defendant received standard preventive medicine counseling
which included a verbal and written order from his commanding officer
to inform prospective sexual partners of his HIV diagnosis prior to any
sexual contact." Thereafter, the defendant engaged in two sexual en-
counters with a female servicemember while wearing a condom, but
failed to inform her of his HIV-positive status.82 On appeal, the defen-
dant challenged the safe sex order as an unconstitutional restriction of
private sexual activity. The court stated that although the defendant
had some expectation of privacy in his sexual activities:
that expectation must be subordinated to the constitutionally
recognized and compelling principle that in every well-ordered society
charged with the duty of conserving the safety of its members the
75. Id.; see also 1993 SuRGEoa GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 2, at 6 (informing the public
that oral sex does present a risk of contracting HIV if the performer has sores or cuts in his or
her mouth).
76. Womack, 27 M.J. at 634.
77. As demonstrated in Womack, some possibility of transmission must be demonstrated to
sustain the validity of a military order to refrain from specific sexual activity. Therefore, medical
expert testimony is a crucial factor in all HIV-related prosecutions. In Utited States v. Perez, 33
M.J. 1050, 1053 (A.C.M.R. 1991), the court dismissed the defendant's conviction for adultery
and assault consummated by battery because the government failed to prove that the defendant
had the ability to assault the victim by transmitting the HIV virus. The defense expert on HIV
testified that based "upon the fact that Sergeant Perez has a vasectomy and the fact that he has
not transmitted the virus to either his wife or to other sexual partners, my best medical opinion is
that Sergeant Perez can't transmit the virus because he has an acellular semen specimen." Id.
This type of a defense is exceedingly uncommon in AIDS or HIV-related cases.
78. 28 M.J. 775 (A.C.M.R. 1989), aff'd, 29 M.J. 324 (C.M.A. 1989).
79. The defendant also was convicted of two charges of adultery under Articles 90 and 134
which factored into his sentence. Id. at 775.
80. Id. at 776 & n.l.
81. Id. at 776.
82. Id. at 778.
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rights of the individual in respect of his liberty may at times, under the
pressures of great dangers, be subjected to such restraint, to be
enforced by reasonable regulations, as the safety of the general public
may demand. 3
The court affirmed the defendant's conviction and noted that his con-
duct resulted in two violations, a week apart, during which the defen-
dant had time not only to reflect on his conduct, but also ample
opportunity to avoid any further dangerous acts.14
The validity of a safe sex order was similarly challenged in United
States v. Dumford,85 where the defendant engaged in unprotected sex-
ual intercourse without disclosing his HIV-positive status, immediately
following his preventive medicine counseling at a nearby hospital.86 The
basis of the defendant's challenge was that the safe sex order could not
extend to consensual intercourse with a civilian while he was off base.
The defendant acknowledged the validity of protecting the health and
welfare of the military community, but argued that "'protecting every
civilian in the world from a military AIDS carrier stretches a valid mih-
tary interest beyond the point of adequately protecting the rights of the
individuals. ' 1'87 In upholding the validity of the order, the court stated
that the obligation to disclose one's HIV-positive status prior to sexual
intercourse must encompass civilian partners, because to find otherwise
would be tantamount to the military relinquishing its obligation to cur-
tail this type of conduct and the spread of AIDS.88
As these cases demonstrate, the military structure provides a disci-
plined environment in which "knowing" transmission of HIV can be
monitored, and quite often, successfully prosecuted. The standard pro-
cedures' for preventive medicine counseling and subsequent orders to
follow these guidelines impose a duty upon servicemembers to disclose
83. Id. at 778. A full discussion of the constitutional issues inherent in HIV and AIDS
regulation is beyond the scope of this Comment. For an in-depth analysis in this area, see The
Constitutional Rights of AIDS Carriers, 99 HAv. L. REV. 1274 (1986) (assessing how courts
should respond to public health regulations enacted in response to AIDS and the threat to indi-
vidual liberties), and Deborah Jones Merritt, Communicable Disease And Constitutional Law:
Controlling AIDS, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 739 (1986) (discussing equal protection jurisprudence and
formulating a new standard for judging the constitutionality of AIDS regulations).
84. Negron, 28 M.J. at 779.
85. 28 M.J. 836 (A.F.C.M.R. 1989), aff'd, 30 M.J. 137 (C.M.A.), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
854 (1990).
86. Id. at 838.
87. Id.
88. Id. Also note that the court upheld the defendant's conviction for aggravated assault as
well as disobeying a "safe sex" order under Article 90. Id. at 839. The defendant received a
sentence including a dishonorable discharge, confinement for two years, total forfeiture of all
pay, and reduction to airman basic. Id.
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their HIV infection to sexual partners and to use condoms during such
encounters. Breaching this duty to disclose establishes a specific basis
for prosecution for conduct in violation of Articles 90 and 134. Al-
though convictions for disobedience of "safe sex" orders and conduct
which discredits or prejudices the armed forces are unique to the mili-
tary, traditional criminal law charges provide a basis for convicting
HIV-positive individuals who knowingly engage in conduct likely to ex-
pose others to HIV in both the military and civilian populations.
IV. TRADITIONAL CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS FOR KNOWING
TRANSMISSION OF HIV
In 1987, newspaper articles contained speculation that criminal pro-
secutors, seeking to charge individuals with knowing transmission of
HIV, would face an impossible burden of proof in order to gain con-
victions for such conduct. 9 Only three years later, fifty-four HIV-re-
lated criminal prosecutions had occurred in the United States, 9°
resulting in convictions for attempted murder and assault. 9' Academic
debate continues on the issue of whether criminalizing HIV transmis-
sion will actually deter knowing transmission of the virus, or merely
encourage individuals to purposely refrain from HIV testing in order
to avoid criminal sanctions through ignorance of their infection. 9 Re-
gardless of the ultimate public benefit or detriment resulting from
such prosecutions, the knowing transmission of HIV is now a punish-
89. See, e.g., Boorstinc, supra note 6, at Al (explaining that prosecutors would have to
show that the defendant carried the virus, knew of the infection, and passed HIV to the victim);
Richard Lacayo, Assault With a Deadly Virus; What Should Courts Do When AIDS is Allegedly
Used as a Weapon?, Tiim, July 20, 1987, at 63 (speculating that prosecutors may have to "prove
that an accused was both infected and aware of that fact"); Doreen Weisenhaus, AIDS Criminal
Laws, Cases Rise; A Dozen States Considering Bills, NAT'L L.J., July 20, 1987, at 3 (reporting
on evidentiary problems in prosecutions for knowing transmission of HIV).
90. Lawrence 0. Gostin, The AIDS Litigation Project, A National Review of Court and
Human Rights Commission Decisions, Part I: The Social Impact of AIDS, 263 J. AM. MED.
Assoc. 1961 (1990)(referring to table 2, giving a case breakdown of AIDS cases by subject mat-
ter). The AIDS Litigation Project is an extensive survey that tracked all cases stemming from
AIDS for the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Sherman, supra note 7, at 3.
91. See, e.g., State v. Haines, 545 N.E.2d 834 (Ind. Ct. App. 2d 1989)(reinstating jury
verdict of attempted murder where HIV-positive defendant intended to inflict others with HIV);
Brock v. State, 555 So. 2d 285 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989)(convicting HIV-positive defendant of
third degree assault for biting corrections officer).
92. See, e.g., Stephen V. Kenney, Comment, Criminalizing HIV Transmission: Lessons
From History and A Model For the Future, 8 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 245, 272-73
(1992) (explaining that prosecutions based on "knowing" transmission of HIV may discourage
individuals from being tested for the virus); Donald H.J. Hermann, Criminalizing Conduct Re-
lated to HIV Transmission, 9 ST. Louis U. PuB. L. REV. 351, 356-57 (1990) (stating the disad-
vantage of criminal statutes is reduction in HIV testing to avoid establishing a basis for criminal
liability).
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able offense under either criminal law theories or specialized statutes
in virtually every state93 and the armed forces. The standard of con-
duct prescribed by these state statutes is very similar to the duty im-
posed upon HIV positive servicemembers under Article 90-to both
inform prospective sexual partners of their infection and use protec-
tive measures during sexual encounters.9 4 This new standard of con-
duct evolved from prosecutions that expanded traditional criminal law
theories to encompass conduct that knowingly placed others at risk
for contracting HIV.
A. Military Prosecutions Under Traditional Criminal Law
Aggravated assault under Article 12891 of the Military Code is a
common basis for prosecuting "knowing" exposure or transmission
of HIV, as demonstrated by the military court's analysis in United
States v. Johnson.9 In that case, the defendant tested positive for
HIV in July 1987, and received extensive medical counseling about
HIV, its transmission through sexual contact, and his obligation to
both inform prospective sexual partners of his HIV status and utilize
appropriate protective measures.9 7 Upon his return from the medical
evaluation and counseling, the defendant met a seventeen-year-old
male and, in the course of the evening, performed fellatio on the
young man. After this encounter, the defendant also placed his "un-
sheathed" penis between the victim's legs. 98 At trial, the court found
the defendant guilty of consensual fellatio and aggravated assault by
means likely to produce death or bodily harm. 9
The basic element of aggravated assault is an assault by "means"
likely to produce death or grievous bodily harm.1°° After reviewing
commentaries and cases resulting in assault convictions, the court con-
cluded that "semen carrying the HIV virus indeed can be a 'means' to
93. Lawrence 0. Gostin, Harvard Professor of Law and Director of the U.S. Public Health
Service AIDS Litigation Project, stated that approximately "300 people around the country have
faced charges that they purposely tried to infect someone with HIV." Louisiana AIDS Law
Faces U.S. Challenge, FT. LAUDERDALE SUN SENTINEL, Nov. 18, 1992, at 5A. Additionally, 25
states now have AIDS-specific statutes that prohibit knowing transmission of HIV. Id. See infra
text accompanying notes 179-205.
94. See supra notes 64-88, and accompanying text.
95. 10 U.S.C. § 928 (1983).
96. 27 M.J. 798 (A.F.C.M.R. 1988), aff'd, 30 M.J. 53 (C.M.A.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 919
(1990).
97. Id. at 800-01.
98. Id. at 801.
99. Id.
100. Wells-Petry, supra' note 45, at 23-24.
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commit aggravated assault."' 101 Because the charge in this case was an
"attempt-type" assault, the prosecution had to demonstrate the spe-
cific intent of the defendant to cause, or the subjective belief that his
conduct would cause, serious bodily injury.'0 2 The court explained
that the defendant's intent was to "gain sexual gratification by releas-
ing semen" which carried HIV and, therefore, constituted a "means"
likely to cause death or bodily harm. 0 3 The court emphasized that al-
though the victim stopped the attempt, the defendant performed an
overt act, by trying to engage in unprotected intercourse with the vic-
tim, which was sufficient to establish a criminal attempt.
104
Expert testimony at trial established that, regardless of whether ac-
tual penetration occurred, gratification through release of HIV-in-
fected semen in this case constituted an assault likely to result in death
or grievous bodily harm. °0 The defendant asserted that the victim's
consent to the sexual acts he performed precluded a conviction. The
court rejected this consent defense, stating that "[w]hatever the degree
of assent to sexual by-play between the individuals, there was no ap-
proval by the victim to transmission of the AIDS disease."' 6 Accord-
ingly, the court upheld the defendant's conviction for aggravated
assault. 107
The issue of consent also arose in United States v. Joseph,08 where
the court upheld the defendant's conviction for aggravated assault
through the exchange of HIV-positive seminal fluid during inter-
course. The defendant received routine counseling after testing HIV
positive in 1988.109 Evidence admitted at trial included a four-page
counseling sheet given to the defendant, which stressed that sexual in-
tercourse spreads HIV and the only "absolute way" to prevent trans-
mission is through abstinence." 0 The victim testified that she feared
becoming pregnant and insisted that the defendant wear a condom
during sexual intercourse."' The court concluded that the victim did
not consent to being placed at risk of contracting the AIDS virus be-
101. Johnson, 27 M.J. at 802.
102. Roger N. Braden, AIDS: Dealing With The Plague, 19 N.Ky. L. REV. 277, 325
(1992)(analyzing the elements of simple and aggravated assault).
103. Johnson, 27 M.J. at 803.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 804.
107. Id. at 805.
108. 33 MJ. 960 (N.M.C.M.R. 1991), aff 'd, 37 M.J. 392 (C.M.A. 1993).
109. Id. at 962.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 962-63.
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cause her testimony exhibited only a fear of becoming pregnant, not
any fear of contracting a sexually transmitted disease. 
1 12
Additionally, the defendant sought a reversal of his assault convic-
tion because he wore a condom during intercourse and failed to ejacu-
late. 1 3 However, the victim testified that she tested HIV-positive six
months after having intercourse with the defendant, which raised the
issue of whether one sexual encounter with an infected individual
wearing a condom could result in transmission of the virus.11 4 Medical
expert testimony offered on this issue established the possibility of
HIV transmission in pre-ejaculation fluid by an analogy to the recog-
nized risk of pregnancy when the penis is withdrawn prior to actual
ejaculation." 5 The testimony also showed that a study of couples who
used condoms over a two-year period resulted in pregnancies in 5 to
15%70 of the women involved. " 6 Based on this testimony, the court
concluded that the defendant knew he was HIV-positive, that sexual
intercourse was a mode of transmission, and that a condom could not
absolutely prevent infection of his sexual partners." 7 Accordingly, the
court affirmed the defendant's conviction and subsequent dis-
charge." 8
The likelihood of transmission plays a significant role in both ag-
gravated assault cases and cases where HIV-positive defendants are
prosecuted under Articles 90 and 134. However, under the traditional
criminal law charge, the likelihood of harm must exceed mere specula-
tion or a remote possibility. 119 In United States v. Schoolfield,2 0 the
court characterized the actions of an HIV-positive defendant who
knowingly engaged in unprotected intercourse as being "similar to
that of pointing a loaded gun at a victim. In this case, by analogy,
because he is HIV-positive, the appellant's gun is loaded and he as-
112. id. at 963 nl. The court did not address whether an assault could be established if the
victim knowingly consented to intercourse after disclosure because the victim's testimony pre-
cluded such a finding. Id. The court reasoned that the "general rule, however, is that one cannot
lawfully consent to a battery that is likely to produce death or serious bodily injury." Id. Accord
United States v. Johnson, 27 M.J. 798, 803 (A.F.C.M.R. 1988)(holding that consent to sexual
intercourse does not constitute consent to contract HIV), aff'd 30 M.J. 53 (C.M.A. 1990), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 919 (1990).
113. Joseph, 33 M.J. at 963.
114. Id. at 963-64. See also Nora Zamichow, Sailor Guilty of Assault in AIDS Virus Case,
L.A. TIMES, Apr. 4, 1990, at B1 (reporting that this "case is the first military case involving
heterosexual AIDS-virus transmission in San Diego").
115. Joseph, 33 M.J. at 964.
116. Id. at 964-65.
117. ld. at 964.
118. Id. at 965.
119. Id. at 964.
120. 36 M.J. 545, 551 (A.C.M.R. 1992).
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saults his victims by merely placing his penis in their vagina, whether
or not he ejaculates in them." 2 , In contrast, actual harm did occur in
United States v. Stewart.122 There the defendant knowingly engaged in
repeated acts of unprotected sexual intercourse without disclosure of
his HIV status, which apparently resulted in his partner testing posi-
tive for HIV.'
21
These military cases attracted public attention and established a ba-
sis for criminal prosecution of knowing HIV transmission through
both specific prohibitive orders and the traditional criminal law theory
of aggravated assault. The military courts developed a body of case
law in which the legitimate public policy of combatting the spread of
HIV and AIDS justified convictions for private sexual activity that
places unsuspecting individuals at risk of contracting the virus. The
courts also determined that consent to sexual intercourse does not
constitute acceptance of the risk of acquiring HIV from an individual
who knows of his or her HIV-positive status, but fails to disclose this
information to a partner. The servicemembers' knowledge of their
HIV-positive status, combined with conduct likely to result in trans-
mission of HIV, established the requisite intent needed for an aggra-
vated assault conviction. As the duty to disclose was enforced in these
cases under criminal law charges, similar state prosecutions also com-
menced for knowing transmission of HIV under traditional criminal
law statutes. The result was an escalation of HIV-related litigation in
the United States.
B. Civilian Prosecutions: Assault by Means of HIV Exposure or
Transmission
As in the military cases discussed above, the most common and suc-
cessful civilian prosecutions related to HIV occur under the charge of
assault through the possible transmission of the virus. In these civilian
cases, the facts must similarly show either the possibility of actual
transmission of HIV through the defendant's conduct or the subjec-
121. Id. at 551. Lawrence Gostin, Executive Director of the American Society of Law and
Medicine, criticized the "loaded gun" analogy and opined that the essential element of sexual
offenses is knowledge of one's HIV-positive status, which merely provides an incentive for indi-
viduals to refrain from being tested. Letter, Spreading AIDS on Purpose, WASH. POST, May 3,
1988, at Z4 (response to article by Sally Squires, see Squires, supra note 11, at Z6). Members of
the military, however, would not fall into the category of individuals who have the option to
refrain from testing due to the mandatory screening policy in the armed forces.
122. 29 M.J. 92 (C.M.A. 1989); see also United States v. Joseph, 33 M.J. 960 (N.M.C.M.R.
1991) (court heard testimony from the victim that she contracted HIV from defendant through
sexual intercourse), aff 'd, 37 M.J. 392 (C.M.A. 1993); see also supra text accompanying notes
108-119.
123. Stewart, 29 M.J. at 93 n.l.
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tive belief by the defendant that transmission was possible. Two cases
prosecuted in 1987 demonstrate the requisite burden of proof for con-
victing an individual for assault by knowingly placing others at risk of
contracting HIV through a human bite.
In United States v. Moore,'2 the court upheld a conviction for as-
sault with a deadly weapon where an HIV-positive defendant bit a
federal corrections officer and the defendant's teeth were considered a
deadly weapon. 25 At trial, a medical expert testified that, although
there had been no reports of HIV transmission through biting, a hu-
man bite can be dangerous because the human mouth carries thirty to
fifty varieties of germs. 126 The defendant challenged the subsequent
conviction on the basis that his HIV-positive status influenced the jur-
y's decision, even though medical testimony established only a remote
possibility of HIV transmission through biting. 2 7 The court rejected
this argument and stated that the trial record contained sufficient evi-
dence for the jury to find that the defendant's mouth and teeth "were
a deadly and dangerous weapon, regardless of the presence or absence
of AIDS."''2
Conversely in Brock v. State,12 9 an Alabama court reversed the de-
fendant's conviction of first-degree assault for attempted transmission
of HIV. 130 Under Alabama law, first-degree assault lies where the de-
fendant commits an assault with intent to cause, and actually inflicts,
serious bodily injury by means of a deadly or dangerous instrument.'
The record demonstrated that the defendant, knowing he was HIV-
positive, bit a corrections officer on the arm during an altercation.
The defendant was convicted of first-degree assault for using his
mouth as a deadly weapon and causing serious bodily injury by biting
the officer and possibly transmitting HIV.32 In reviewing the trial rec-
ord, the appellate court stated that there was no evidence presented at
trial to show that biting was a possible means of spreading AIDS, nor
was there any evidence to support a finding of serious bodily injury."'
124. 846 F.2d 1163 (8th Cir. 1988).
125. Id. at 1164.
126. Id. at 1165.
127. Id. at 1167.
128. Id. at 1168. The decision in Aoore was criticized for creating a precedent for juries to
convict an HIV-positive individual "for assault with a deadly and dangerous weapon under the
pretense of convicting the defendant for transmitting dangerous germs." Carlton D. Stansbury,
Deadly and Dangerous Weapons and AIDS: The Moore Analysis is Likely to be Dangerous, 74
IOWA L. REv. 951, 952 (1989).
129. 555 So. 2d 285 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989).
130. Id. at 287.
131. Id.
132. id. at 286-87.
133. Id. at 288.
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In the alternative, the court stated that the prosecution also failed to
prove that the defendant "intended to cause serious physical injury
when he bit" the officer. 34 Ultimately, the court held that the evi-
dence did establish the elements of assault in the third degree, a
charge totally unrelated to the defendant's HIV-positive status.'3 5
The court in Scroggins v. State'3 6 used the same analysis as in Brock
to uphold a conviction for aggravated assault with intent to commit
murder against an HIV-positive defendant who bit a police officer.'
The prosecution demonstrated that the defendant raised excess saliva
into his mouth and then bit the officer's arm, resulting in a wound
that took ten months to heal. 3 ' An admission by the defendant dem-
onstrated that he knew that he was HIV-positive at the time of the
altercation. 3 9 In comparison to both Moore and Brock, the court held
that the jury's finding of intent was supported by evidence establish-
ing that the defendant filled his mouth with excess saliva prior to bit-
ing the officer, thus increasing the possibility of transmitting the
virus. 4' The court emphasized that impossibility of committing the in-
tended crime is not a defense when the defendant believed he could
transmit the virus through the method employed.'
4'
Specific intent to inflict serious bodily harm was the issue on appeal
in Commonwealth v. Brown. 42 The HIV-positive defendant was con-
victed of aggravated assault by the means of throwing fecal matter in
the face of a prison guard. When confronted after the incident, the
defendant stated that the officer was tampering with his mail and he
kept cups of fecal liquid in his cell to combat such intrusions.4 3 The
evidence demonstrated that the defendant received counseling from
both a physician and a nurse after he tested positive for HIV, which
included information that the virus is transmitted through bodily
fluids.'" The court upheld the conviction for aggravated assault be-
cause the evidence, showing the defendant's prior knowledge of HIV
transmission in conjunction with the act of throwing infected fecal
134. Id.
135. Id. For a detailed analysis of the court's decision, see Timothy P. Martin, Brock v.
State: The AIDS Virus as a Deadly Weapon, 24 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 677 (1991).
136. 401 S.E.2d 13 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990).
137. Id. at 15.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 18. Additionally, the court noted that the defendant merely laughed when the
police officer asked if he had AIDS. Id.
141. Id.
142. 605 A.2d 429 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
143. Id. at 431.
144. Id.
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matter in the prison guard's face, established a specific intent to inflict
serious physical injury.'
45
Finally, Zule v. State, 14 provides an example of a conviction for
aggravated sexual assault by homosexual intercourse and actual trans-
mission of HIV to a minor victim. The facts show that the defendant,
knowing he was HIV-positive, engaged in anal intercourse with a fif-
teen-year-old male. 147 This sexual encounter occurred in 1987, and by
mid-1989, the victim tested positive for HIV. 48 The defendant as-
serted that the prosecution failed to show that the victim did not ac-
quire HIV from another sexual encounter in 1989 with a different
partner.'4 9 However, extensive medical testimony at trial analyzed the
sequence of sexual encounters and showed that in this case, the victim
or "penetrated party is much more likely to contract HIV than the
penetrator."' 150 Whereas in the victim's only other sexual encounter,
he was the "penetrator" which decreased the possibility of his con-
tracting HIV from that partner. The court noted that the testimony
also established that the defendant's ability to transmit the virus was
heightened because he was in the latter stages of HIV infection at the
time of the encounter. 5' Based upon this evidence, the court upheld
the defendant's conviction for aggravated sexual assault and transmis-
sion of HIV.
152
In all of these cases, the defendants were aware of their HIV-posi-
tive status and either intended to transmit HIV or knew that their con-
duct could result in the possibility of transmitting the virus. The
elements of assault do not mandate a demonstration of actual HIV
transmission in order to convict a defendant for conduct which may
result in serious bodily injury. When an HIV-positive individual's as-
saultive conduct is preceded by threats of death against another or
calculated efforts to bring about such a result, the offense can rise to
the level of attempted murder.
C. Civilian Prosecutions: Attempted Murder Based Upon Possibility
of HIV Exposure or Transmission
Although less common than convictions for assault with the virus,
successful prosecutions do occur for attempted murder based upon in-
145. Id.
146. 802 S.W.2d 28 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990).
147. Id. at 32-33.
148. Id. at 34-35.
149. Id.
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tentional infliction of HIV. The elements of this offense, as applied to
the conduct of an HIV-positive individual, require that the person
purposely or knowingly attempted to engage in conduct that would
result in the death of another, if the circumstances were as the person
believed them to be, or the person actually took a substantial step to
effectuate the death of another. 5 ' Prosecuted conduct in several cases
consisted of knowingly engaging in sexual intercourse or intentional
biting and spitting while infected with HIV. The premise for convic-
tion is that successful completion of these activities would result in the
victim's death.
Perhaps no other area of criminal prosecution for HIV transmission
generates as much criticism as cases that elevate biting and spitting to
the offense of attempted murder. 5 4 Although medical research does
not support this premise, and no known cases have resulted in actual
HIV transmission, 55 convictions for attempted murder do occur un-
der specific and limited circumstances. An Indiana case, State v.
Haines,56 provides a factual scenario where scratching, biting and
spitting by an HIV-positive individual established the basis for at-
tempted murder. On appeal, the court reversed the trial judge's ruling
that vacated the defendant's conviction for three counts of attempted
murder and imposed a conviction for three counts of battery. 57
The facts show that police officers arrived at the defendant's apart-
ment after receiving a call about a possible suicide. Upon entering the
apartment, the officers found the defendant lying unconscious on the
floor in a pool of blood leaking from slash wounds in his wrists.'
Shortly thereafter, the defendant regained consciousness and
screamed that "he should be left to die because he had AIDS."' 5 9 As
153. MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 5.01, 210.2 (Criminal Attempt and Murder respectively).
154. E.g., Amy Goldstein, HIV Victim Charged in Attack, Bite Called Attempt to Kill U.S.
Officer, WASH. POST, June 5, 1992, at DI (reporting that the case of an HIV-positive man
charged with attempted murder for biting U.S. Secret Service Officer caused an angry reaction
from AIDS activists); Gostin, supra note 121 at Z4 (stating that even "if the criminal law could
deter biting or spitting, it still probably would not prevent one case of AIDS, since these behav-
iors do not spread the virus"); David Margolick, The AIDS Docket: A Special Report; Tide of
Lawsuits Portrays Society Ravaged by AIDS, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1992, at I (reporting on the
case of a man accused of attempted murder by spitting on a prison guard and his defense lawyer
commenting that "spittle saturated with H.I.V., is no murder weapon").
155. Lifson, supra note 32, at 1354 (stating that the risk of infection after exposure to saliva
in casual settings should be negligible); Gerald H. Friedland & Robert S. Klein, Transmission of
the Human Immunodeficiency Virus, 317 NEW. ENo. J. MED. 1125, 1126 (1987) (Table I show-
ing only three known modes of HIV transmission, which include exposure through contaminated
blood, sexual intercourse, and perinatal transfer from mother to fetus).
156. 545 N.E.2d 834 (Ind. Ct. App. 2d 1989).
157. Id. at 835.
158. Id.
159. Id.
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paramedics arrived, the defendant became combative and threatened
to give the officers AIDS through his bleeding wounds. The defendant
flailed his arms and sprayed blood into an officer's eyes and mouth.
As the defendant struggled against the emergency medical personnel,
he proceeded to scratch, bite and spit on several officers and par-
amedics. The defendant also commented that "he was going to show
everyone else what it was like to have the disease and die."
160
In his defense, the defendant argued that the prosecution did not
present evidence to support the inference that his conduct constituted
a substantial step toward the commission of murder because medical
testimony failed to show the likelihood of HIV transmission through
his actions.16' In rejecting this argument, the court stated that impossi-
bility is not a defense to attempted murder where the defendant "did
all that he believed necessary to bring about an intended result.'
' 62
Furthermore, the court noted that a medical expert testified that direct
exposure to HIV-positive blood through the mouth, eyes and skin had
resulted in HIV transmission in three cases involving health care
workers. 6 Testimony at trial also established that the defendant re-
ceived counseling from his doctor when he tested positive for HIV,
which included information regarding the lethal nature of HIV and
the modes of transmission. Based upon the defendant's knowledge of
his HIV-positive status, the fatality of the disease, and his belief that
HIV could be transmitted by throwing infected blood, biting, and
spitting, the court held that sufficient evidence existed to support the
jury's finding that the defendant possessed the requisite intent and
purposely "took a substantial step toward the commission of mur-
der.,, 14
As demonstrated in Haines, the impossibility of HIV transmission
is not a defense where the prosecution demonstrates the specific intent
and substantial action by the defendant to effectuate the death of an-
other person. Expert medical opinions provide the correlation between
intentional conduct and the possibility of HIV transmission to support
a conviction for attempted murder. In Weeks v. State, 65 the court up-
held a conviction for attempted murder where an HIV-positive inmate
spit on a prison guard. After previous threats to infect prison guards
with HIV, the defendant spit twice at a guard, covering his glasses,
160. Id. at 835.
161. Id. at 838.
162. Id. at 838-39.
163. Id. at 839-841.
164. Id. at 841. A newspaper report indicated that Haines received a sentence of six years in
the state penitentiary as a result of the remanded jury trial. See Squires, supra note 11, at Z6.
165. 834 S.W.2d 559 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992).
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lips and nose with saliva.'6 Testimony of witnesses revealed that the
defendant "told everybody that he had AIDS and that he was going
to take as many [people] with him as he could" when he died of the
disease.' 67 A medical expert testified that there was a "theoretical"
possibility of transmitting HIV by spitting into a person's mouth or
nose, especially if the defendant was in the latter and more contagious
stages of HIV infection.'" The defense expert contradicted this testi-
mony by stating that no documentation existed to show that HIV
could be transmitted through saliva, and if this type of transmission
were possible, many cases would already have been reported. 6 9 Al-
though the medical expert testimony was in conflict, the court upheld
the defendant's conviction for attempted murder because sufficient
evidence existed to show that the defendant "could have transmitted
HIV by spitting."' 70
Although the possibility of HIV transmission in Weeks was "theo-
retical," the controlling factors in upholding his conviction for at-
tempted murder were the defendant's prior threats to kill the prison
guards through infection with HIV and his belief that spitting could
accomplish this purpose. Cases involving prosecutions for biting and
spitting by HIV-positive individuals generally evidence intent through
prior threatening behavior by the defendants."' However, charges of
attempted murder based on knowing transmission of HIV through
sexual intercourse infrequently include manifestations of intent
through murderous threats. In these rare cases, intent must be estab-
lished through the act of knowingly engaging in sexual intercourse
while infected with HIV, comprehension of the fatality of the disease,
knowledge of the modes of transmission, and the surrounding circum-
stances. 172
For example, in 1992, an Oregon judge sentenced an HIV-positive
man to sixty-five months in prison for attempted murder on the basis
166. Id. at 561.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 563.
169. Id. at 564.
170. Id. at 565.
171. See State v. Smith, 621 A.2d 493 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993)(involving extensive
and repeated threats by inmate with HIV to kill officers by biting and spitting), cert. denied, 634
A.2d 523 (N.J. 1993).
172. In a Florida case, State v. Sherouse, 536 So. 2d 1194, 1195 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989), the
court addressed the merit of charges for attempted involuntary manslaughter against a an HIV-
positive prostitute who offered and agreed to engage in sexual intercourse with two males on
separate occasions. After holding that the crime of involuntary manslaughter is not recognized in
Florida, the court explained that ironically "a charge of the greater crime of attempted second
degree murder arguably could have been sustained since second degree murder does not require
any specific intent to kill another person." Id. (emphasis in original).
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of knowingly exposing a seventeen-year-old girl to HIV through sex-
ual intercourse. 73 The defendant had unprotected sex with the victim
while knowing he was HIV-positive. Actual transmission was not an
issue because the victim tested negative for HIV after the encounter.
However, aggravating circumstances did support the conviction be-
cause this was not the only reported incident in which the defendant
knowingly engaged in unprotected sexual intercourse without warning
his partners. 74 In a similar case in 1991, the same defendant pled no
contest and received probation for the same type of conduct. The fe-
male victim in this earlier case developed AIDS. The third victim who
engaged in sexual intercourse with the defendant subsequently died of
AIDS.
175
In contrast, most cases involving the possibility of knowing trans-
mission of HIV through sexual intercourse do not present circum-
stances which support the charge of attempted murder. In 1987, a
man with HIV who sexually attacked a female patient in a hospital
mental ward was charged with attempted murder on the basis of
transmission of HIV. 7 6 The defendant's knowledge of his HIV-posi-
tive status in conjunction with his sexual attack provided the grounds
for attempted murder, rather than evidence of a specific intent to
cause death. 77 In the absence of actual transmission, specific intent
exhibited by murderous threats, or the subjective belief by the individ-
ual that his or her behavior could effectuate the death of another per-
son, a successful prosecution for attempted murder is not likely to
occur."'
173. Man Gets 9-year Prison Term for Exposing Girl to HIV, Drugs, Cm. Tram., Dec. 1,
1992. at M5 (reporting that Alberto Gonzalez was sentenced to 65 months in prison for know-
ingly exposing a seventeen-year-old girl to HIV).
174. Adam Nossiter, Some Legal Experts See Intolerance as H.L V. and Sex Are Linked to
Crime, N.Y. TnEs, Nov. 28, 1992, at 7.
175. Id.
176. Nieson Himmel, Rape Suspect with AIDS Held in Attempted Murder Case, L.A.
TiMEs, Sept. 11, 1987, at 42.
177. In a similar case in 1993, a Florida man was charged with attempted first degree murder
for allegedly forcing three young boys to have anal intercourse with him while knowing he was
infected with HIV. Wilda L. White, Controversy Surrounds Case of AIDS as a Deadly Weapon,
TALLAA ss DEMOrCRAT, July 8, 1993, at 2C. The newspaper report explained that under Florida
law, prosecutors can charge the defendant with attempted murder even though "there is no
claim that he intended to kill the young boys he is accused of raping." Id. The prosecutors will
be required to show that the HIV-positive rapist "could cause the death of his victim." Id. The
testimony of medical experts is crucial in this type of case to establish the likelihood of actual
transmission of HIV in order to obtain a conviction for attempted murder.ld.
178. In 1987 Joseph Edward Markowski was charged with two counts of attempted murder
and two counts of assault with great bodily injury for having unprotected sex with another man
while knowing he could transmit HIV. Terry Pristin, Key Witness Refuses to Testify in AIDS
Murder Attempt Trial, L.A. Timss, Sept. 2, 1987, at Metro 3. The victim, who tested HIV-
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This brief analysis reveals an initiative to penalize conduct that
knowingly or deliberately places others at an uninformed risk of con-
tracting HIV. To convict under either assault or attempted murder
statutes, however, the facts of the incident must correspond to the
individual elements of the offense. Due to this rigid format, twenty-
five states have enacted specialized statutes that provide the independ-
ent offense of knowing or intentional transmission of HIV through
sexual or other types of contact.1 9
V. SPECIALIZED STATE STATUES PROHIBITING KNOWING TRANSMISSION
OF HIV
Specialized state statutes impose liability for failing to disclose one's
HIV-positive status to sexual partners or for failing to use protective
measures during sexual intercourse. In addition to prosecution under
traditional criminal law theories, these statutes create a basis for a
specific standard of acceptable conduct. These statutes contain three
essential elements: (1) the person knowingly, (2) engaged in defined
behavior, (3) likely to transmit HIV.1s° From this basic model, some
states have expanded the basis for liability by penalizing individuals
who do not disclose their HIV-positive status to partners prior to en-
positive a year after these encounters, refused to testify against Markowski. Id. In the absence of
a specific intent to kill or evidence of actual transmission, the prosecution could not proceed
with attempted murder charges. Terry Pristin, Charges of Attempted Murder Voided in Case of
AIDS Tainted Blood, L.A. TIMEs, Dec. 2, 1987, at Metro I (also reporting on related charges
against Markowski for knowingly selling his HIV-contaminated blood to a local blood bank).
179. Alabama: ALA. CODE § 22-11A-21 (1990); Arkansas: ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-123 (Mi-
chie Supp. 1993); Colorado: CoLo. REV. STAT. § 25-4-1406 (1989); Delaware: DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 16 § 704 (Supp. 1992); Florida: FLA. STAT. § 384.24 (1993); Georgia: GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-
60 (Michie Supp. 1992); Idaho: IDAHO CODE § 39-608 (Supp. 1992); Illinois: ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
38, para. 12-16.2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992); Indiana: IND. CODE ANN. § 16-1-10.5-8.5 (Burns
1990); Kentucky: KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 529.090 (Baldwin 1991); Louisiana: LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 43.5 (Wesf Supp. 1993); Maryland: MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 18-601.1 (1990);
Michigan: MICH. CoMp. LAWS § 333.5210 (1992); Mississippi: Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-23-25
(1981); Missouri: Mo. ANN. STAT. § 191.677 (Vernon Supp. 1993); Montana: MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 50-18-112 (1991); Nev, Rev. Stat. § 441A.300 (Michie 1991); Ohio: OHio REv. CODE ANN. §
3701.81 (Anderson Supp. 1992); Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1192.1 (West Supp.
1993); South Carolina: S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-29-145 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992); Tennessee:
TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-10-107 (1992); Texas: TEX. CODE ANN. § 22.012 (West Supp. 1993);
Utah: UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-6-5 (Supp. 1993); Washington: WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
9A.36.021 (West Supp. 1993); West Virginia: W. VA. CODE § 16-4-20 (1991).
180. See, e.g., Criminal Transmission of HIV ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 38, para. 12-16.2 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1992). "A person commits criminal transmission of HIV when he or she, knowing
that he or she is infected with HIV: (1) engages in intimate contact with another; (2) transfers,
donates, or provides his or her blood . . ." Id. See also Donald H.J. Hermann, Criminalizing
Conduct Related to HIV Transmission, 9 ST. Louis UNiv. Pua. L. REV. 351, 369-77
(1990)(providing detailed descriptions of many state statutes criminalizing HIV transmission).
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gaging in sexual contact.181 Knowledge of one's HIV-positive status
establishes the intent requirement for prosecution under most of the
specialized statutes.'82 An analysis of two cases that resulted in convic-
tions for "knowingly" engaging in proscribed conduct illustrates
prosecution under an HIV-specific statute.
In People v. Dempsey,"3 the defendant was charged with aggra-
vated criminal sexual assault and criminal transmission of HIV, a spe-
cific offense under the Illinois Criminal Code. I8 4 The facts adduced at
trial show that in 1989 the defendant was informed by his physician
that he had HIV and also received counseling about his potential to
infect others through transmission of body fluids, such as blood and
semen.8 5 The victim in this case was the defendant's nine-year-old
brother, who slept in the defendant's room one evening in 1990. At
trial, the victim testified that early the next morning the defendant
placed his penis in the victim's mouth and ejaculated.8 6 After hearing
testimony regarding the defendant's knowledge of his infection and
the modes of HIV transmission, the jury convicted the defendant on
both charges.
8 7
On appeal, the defendant challenged his conviction for criminal
transmission of HIV on the basis that the statute was "unconstitution-
ally vague and therefore invalid.' '8 8 In upholding the statute, the
court explained that the statute as applied to the defendant in this case
provided sufficient notice that the charged conduct constituted a crim-
inal offense.8 9 The statute provided that a person commits "criminal
transmission of HIV when he or she, knowing that he or she is in-
181. See, e.g., TEX. CODE ANN. § 22.012 (West Supp. 1993). Intentional exposure of another
to AIDS or HIV occurs when an infected person "intentionally engages in conduct reasonably
likely to result in the transfer" of bodily fluids and "the other person consented to the transfer
but at the time of giving consent had not been informed by the actor that the actor had AIDS or
was a carrier of HIV."Id.
182. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-60 (Michie Supp. 1992) (prohibiting any HIV infected per-
son from "knowingly" engaging in sexual intercourse without disclosing his or her infection to
the other person); IDAHO CODE § 39-608 (Supp. 1992) (stating that any person "who exposes
another in any manner with the intent to infect or, knowing that he or she is or has been af-
flicted . . . is guilty of a felony .... ) (emphasis added); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-29-145 (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1992) (stating that it is unlawful for a person who "knows that he is infected"
with HIV to "knowingly" engage in sexual intercourse).
183. 610 N.E.2d 208 (I11. App. Ct. 5th 1993).
184. See Criminal Transmission of HIV ILL. STAT. ANN. 1989 ch. 38, para. 12-16.2(a)(1)
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992). In Dempsey, the court reached the conviction based upon the 1989
provision that is essentially the same as the 1992 statute.
185. Dempsey, 610 N.E.2d at 213.
186. Id. at 210.
187. Id. at 216.
188. Id. at 222.
189. Id.
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fected with HIV engages in intimate contact with another," which in-
cludes exposure to the body fluids of an HIV-infected person in a
"manner that could result in the transmission of HIV."' 9 The court
explained that the evidence demonstrated that the defendant knew
HIV could be transmitted through semen and that oral intercourse
was a possible means of transmission. Therefore, the court concluded
that the defendant's conduct clearly fell within the proscribed conduct
under the statute.19'
Compared to the complex medical expert testimony employed in
previous cases where "knowing" transmission of HIV formed the ba-
sis for assault or attempted murder charges, the analysis in Dempsey
was straightforward due to the correlation between the statutory ele-
ments and the charged conduct. 192 The evolution of HIV-specific sta-
tutes has resulted in effective prosecutions for knowingly engaging in
conduct that is likely to result in HIV transmission. The prosecution
must show that the defendant knew of his or her HIV-positive status
and the means of HIV transmission, prior to engaging in conduct that
is likely to place another at an uninformed risk of contracting the vi-
rus. A specific intent to transmit the virus or cause bodily harm is not
an element of most of these statutory offenses.
State v. Stark 93 provides an example of a conviction for "inten-
tional" transmission of HIV through heterosexual intercourse under
the Washington specialized statute that contains an "intent" element.
In this case, the defendant exposed three female partners to HIV over
the course of two years.194 Testimony at trial showed that the defen-
190. Id.
191. Id. at 223.
192. The Dempsey case also provides an example of an abuse of discretion in the sentencing
phase of an HIV-related charge. Id. at 227. The trial judge sentenced the defendant to 33 years
for criminal sexual assault and seven years for criminal transmission of HIV. Id. at 210. The
appellate court remanded the case for resentencing before a different judge due to these com-
ments by the trial judge while addressing the defendant:
Let everybody be innocent bystanders while you run through the crowd at will, and
wherever you find a possibility spread your sperm or body fluids maybe in a way to
cause a spread of this horrible disease .... I hope that people who hear of this will
think it's best if they have the HIV virus that they start protecting the public and not
be like a mad dog out in the wilds biting anything that comes along or stands still or
falls over backwards.
Id. at 226.
Finally, the appellate court concluded as follows: "[t]he sentencing judge was so prejudiced by
fear of the disease that he let improper factors influence him and did not consider the requisite
statutory factors." Id. at 227. Another example of irrational judicial conduct includes the impo-
sition of a 10 foot rule in court that allowed guards to remain 10 feet from HIV-infccted defen-
dants. See Courts Found to Perpetuate AIDS Myths, Judges Misunderstand Risks, Report Says,
L.A. Timws, Jan. 19, 1992, at AIg.
193. 832 P.2d 109 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992).
194. Id. at 112.
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dant tested positive for HIV in 1988 and received extensive counseling
on five occasions at a local health department. "He was taught about
'safe sex,' the risk of spreading the infection, and the necessity of in-
forming his partners before engaging in sexual activity with them." 19
Thereafter, the defendant engaged in unprotected sexual intercourse
with the first victim on two occasions prior to informing her that he
was HIV-positive. After six sexual encounters with the second victim,
the defendant not only informed her of his HIV status, but also gave
her an AZT pill "'to slow down the process of the AIDS."' "96 The
final victim testified that the defendant never wore a condom or in-
formed her of his HIV infection, even though they had sexual inter-
course almost every night for a month. When this victim ended the
relationship, the defendant "told her that he carried HIV and ex-
plained that if he had told her, she would not have had anything to do
with him."'19" Finally, a friend testified that she had told the defendant
that he had a responsibility to protect others from transmission of the
virus. He responded, "'I don't care. If I'm going to die, everybody's
going to die." ' 98 Based on this evidence, the trial court convicted the
defendant on three counts of assault in the second degree.'l"
The specialized statute provided that any person who "exposes or
transmits" HIV with intent to do bodily harm is guilty of assault in
the second-degree. 2°° Therefore, this HIV-specific statute requires a
demonstration of "intent" beyond the mere knowledge of one's HIV-
positive status and engaging in conduct likely to transmit HIV. Never-
theless, the court held that the defendant's knowledge of his HIV in-
fection, his conduct which exposed all three victims to HIV, and his
comments evincing disregard for the health of these victims, estab-
lished sufficient "intent" to cause bodily harm as required under the
statute.20' This reasoning is similar to that in the aforementioned as-
195. Id. at I11.
196. Id. at 112. AZT is an acronym for antiretroviral zidovudine, a drug used to forestall the
effects of HIV on the infected person's immune system. "Although AZT does not kill HIV,
treatment with AZT may increase a patient's survival time by delaying further deterioration of
the immune system and decreasing the frequency and severity of opportunistic infections."
Macher, supra note 17, at 16.
197. Stark, 832 P.2d at 112.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 111-12.
200. Id. n. 1.
201. id. at 114. As in Dempsey, the appellate court remanded this case for resentencing be-
cause of an abuse of discretion by the trial judge. The trial court imposed an exceptional sen-
tence of 10 years, due to the defendant's irresponsible conduct and "future dangerousness" to
society, Id. at 116-17. The appellate court explained there was no evidence showing that any of
the victims contracted the virus or that the defendant's conduct was the most egregious, thus
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sault and attempted murder cases. However, the elements of exposure
and transmission of HIV are specifically defined in statutes, such as
Washington's, which eliminates the need for extensive testimony re-
garding the possible modes of transmission based upon the charged
conduct.
Statutes criminalizing HIV transmission usually include an affirma-
tive defense where the defendant informed the victim of his or her
HIV infection prior to engaging in conduct likely to transmit the vi-
rus. For example, the statutes enacted in Arkansas, Florida, Georgia,
Idaho, Illinois, Louisiana, South Carolina and Texas include provi-
sions recognizing "informed" consent by the victim as an affirmative
defense to the charge of criminal transmission of HIV.0 2 However,
the victim's consent merely to engage in sexual intercourse does not
operate as an affirmative defense in the absence of prior notification
by the accused of his or her HIV-positive status. Similarly, defenses
such as withdrawal prior to ejaculation, or lack of medical evidence to
support the likelihood of transmission by the means employed, are
unlikely to prevail because the elements of knowledge and prohibited
conduct are defined by the statute rather than by the probability of
transmission.
The scope of HIV-specific statutes and the corresponding penalties
imposed for violations vary from state to state. The Louisiana statute
does not include an intent element, and establishes a possible sentence
of ten years of imprisonment with or without hard labor and a maxi-
mum fine of $5,000 for knowing exposure or transmission of HIV.203
In 1990 an HIV-positive man was convicted for criminally exposing an
eight-year-old boy to HIV and faced a possible sentence of seven years
supporting an exceptional sentence. Id. at 117. For examples of cases in which the defendant's
HIV-positive status did constitute an aggravating factor in the calculation of the sentence, see
State v. Farmer, 805 P.2d 200 (Wash. 1991) (upholding exceptional sentence on the basis of the
defendant's deliberate cruelty to a juvenile by engaging in sexual intercourse while knowing or
believing he was HIV-positive), and Cooper v. State, 539 So. 2d 508 (Fla. ist DCA
1989)(affirming heightened sentence on the basis of the defendant's reckless disregard for the
health of sexual battery victim by engaging in sexual intercourse with the minor knowing or
suspecting he was HIV-positive).
202. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-123 (Michie Supp. 1993); FLA. STAT. § 384.24 (1993); GA.
CODE ANN. § 16-5-60 (Michie Supp. 1992); IDAHO CODE § 39-608 (Supp. 1992); Criminal Trans-
mission of HIV ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-16.2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 43.5 (West Supp. 1993); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-29-145 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992); TEx.
CODE ANN. § 22.012 (West Supp. 1993).
203. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43.5 (West Supp. 1993); see also Man Guilty of Exposing Girlf-
riend, Baby to AIDS, ST. PETERSBURG Timms, Nov. 20, 1992, at 12A (reporting a case where an
HIV-positive defendant, convicted of knowingly exposing his former girlfriend and their unborn
child to AIDS, faced a possible sentence of 10 years in jail and a fine of $5,000).
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in prison under the Illinois specialized statute.2° 4 Under Florida's spe-
cialized statute, "knowing" transmission of HIV constitutes a misde-
meanor offense carrying a maximum sentence of one year
imprisonment. 20 1 These are only a few examples of the varied penalties
that states impose for knowing transmission of HIV. These specialized
statutes have been criticized because they impose penalties in the ab-
sence of actual injury or transmission of the virus.
Opponents of HIV-related prosecutions claim that in the absence of
actual transmission or injury, no liability should be imposed for risk-
related conduct.2 °0 This position advocates that education, counseling
and behavior remodification present more advantageous methods for
combatting the spread of HIV or AIDS than criminal sanctions. 20 7
This view appears to presume that only one public policy approach
can be successful in restraining the spread of AIDS and recalcitrant
behavior. The importance of education and social services should not
preclude prosecutions for those few HIV-positive individuals who
continue to "knowingly" engage in conduct that threatens the health
of others and perpetuates HIV transmission. Consequently, a public
health approach and criminal liability for conduct that knowingly
places unsuspecting individuals at risk are not mutually exclusive, but
rather adjuncts in an effort to cultivate and enforce a new standard of
conduct within our society.
204. Passed the Virus, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 5, 1990, at 6 (reporting the conviction of Randall
Lee Dempsey, believed to be the first conviction under the HIV specific statute in Illinois).
205. FLA. STAT. § 384.34 (1993). In the 1993 session, the Florida Legislature passed Chapter
93-227, which established the offense of "criminal transmission of HIV" for offenders who
previously tested HIV-positive after convictions for offenses such as sexual battery, incest, as-
sault, battery or prostitution and proceed to commit a second or subsequent offense after testing
positive. Ch. 93-227 § 8, 1993 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 1814, 1818 (West)(to be codified at FLA.
STAT. § 775.0877). This type of offense is different from the usual "knowing transmission"
statutes because the basis for criminal liability is associated with an existing crime rather than
merely engaging in consensual sexual intercourse with knowledge of one's HIV-positive status.
This new offense should circumvent prior difficulties in effectively controlling the spread of HIV
by infected prostitutes. For a report on this problem, see Bob LaMendola, Hookers Walking the
Streets Hiding HIVDangers, FT. LAUDERDALE SU-SENrsIEL, Feb. 4, 1992, at IB (describing the
difficulties in prosecuting prostitutes under Florida's specialized statute due to the confidentiality
laws preventing police and prosecutors from seeing an individual's HIV test results).
206. For example, section 211.1 of the Model Penal Code provides that a person is guilty of
assault if he or she "attempts to cause or purposely, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily
injury to another." Model Penal Code § 211.1 (1962) (emphasis added). The possibility of crimi-
nal conviction for an attempted assault is very similar to convictions for knowing transmission
because actual harm is not an element of the offense.
207. See Tamar Lewin, Rights of Citizens and Society Raise Legal Muddle on AIDS, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 14, 1987, at Al (reporting that Nan D. Hunter, a lawyer with the American Civil
Liberties Union AIDS projects, argues that "social service intervention is more effective than
enforcement action, even in difficult situations"); see also Gostin, The Politics of AIDS, supra
note 32, at 1057-58 (1989)(promoting a public health solution rather than strict criminal penalties
as more effective in combatting the spread of AIDS).
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VI. LIABILITY FOR KNOWING TRANSMISSION OF HIV IN THE HEALTH-
CARE SETTING
The previous sections of this Comment provide an overview of
HIV-related litigation in the United States. Whether under the Mili-
tary Codes and Regulations, traditional criminal law theories, or spe-
cialized state statutes, the knowing exposure or transmission of HIV
to an uninformed person constitutes a punishable offense. Concurrent
with this type of litigation, a new standard of conduct has emerged
that mandates individuals with HIV refrain from engaging in conduct
known to place others at risk of contracting the virus. After consider-
ing the development of this new social responsibility in the context of
both the military and civilian populations, it is not surprising that
public concern regarding "knowing" transmission or exposure to HIV
would extend to the health care setting. Recognition of an equivalent
duty for HIV-positive health care workers to either refrain from risk-
related procedures or disclose their infection to patients is the final
stage of this analysis.
A. Establishing a Medical Duty to Refrain from Knowing
Transmission of HIV
In 1987 the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) published "Recom-
mendations for Prevention of HIV Transmission in Health-Care Set-
tings." 208 The CDC advocated the use of "universal precautions" for
all patients, even in the absence of actual documentation of infection
with HIV.209 Barrier protection through the use of gloves, masks, pro-
tective eyewear and face shields were recommended during any proce-
dures likely to result in exposure to blood or other body fluids.
210
Although the majority of the CDC's recommendations focused upon
health care workers taking precautions against acquiring HIV from
patient contact, the final section of the report dealt with the "manage-
ment of infected health-care workers." 21 1
The CDC acknowledged that although no known transmissions of
HIV from health care worker to patient had been reported, transmis-
sion during invasive procedures remained a possibility.2 12 In addition
208. Recommendations for Prevention of HIV Transmission in Health-Care Settings, 36
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. Supp. No. 2S (Aug. 21, 1987).
209. Id. at 5S. The CDC explained that since "medical history and examination cannot relia-
bly identify all patients infected with HIV or other blood-borne pathogens, blood and body-fluid
precautions should be consistently used for all patients." Id. (emphasis in original).
210. Id. at 6S.
211. Id. at 16S.
212. Id. at 7S.
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to emphasizing the need for infected health care workers to follow
universal precautions, the CDC stated:
The question of whether workers infected with HIV-especially
those who perform invasive procedures-can adequately and safely
be allowed to perform patient-care duties or whether their work
assignments should be changed must be determined on an individual
basis. These decisions should be made by the health-care worker's
personal physician(s) in conjunction with the medical directors and
personnel health service staff of the employing institution or
hospital.
213
The recommendation for self-enforcement on an ad hoc basis was due
in part to the exceedingly low risk of transmission from an infected
health care worker to a patient. The prospective risk of an HIV-posi-
tive surgeon infecting a patient through one surgical operation ranges
from 1 in 42,000 to I in 420,000.24 Therefore, the likelihood of HIV
transmission from an infected health care worker who does not per-
form highly invasive procedures would constitute an even lower per-
centage of risk to the patient. 215 Whereas, the risk of a health care
worker acquiring HIV from an infected needle stick or exposure to the
mucous membranes of an infected patient is estimated in the range of
0.9% to 0.03076.216
In 1988 the American Medical Association Council on Ethical and
Judicial Affairs published what appeared to be a more stringent rec-
ommendation for HIV-positive physicians. While emphasizing a non-
discriminatory approach for the treatment of all HIV-positive
individuals, the Council explained:
213. Recommendations for Prevention of HIV Transmission in Health-Care Settings, 36
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. Supp. No. 2S, 16S (Aug. 21, 1987).
214. Alain J. Marengo-Rowe, Of Mole and Trojan Horse: Human Immunodeficiency Virus
Infection, 60 DEF. COUNS. J. 376, 380 (1993) (estimates based upon report in CDC, Estimates of
the Risks of Endemic Transmission of Hepatitis B Virus and Human Immunodeficiency Virus to
Patients by the Percutaneous Route During Invasive Surgical and Dental Procedures (1991)); see
also Lawrence Gostin, HIV-Infected Physicians and the Practice of Seriously Invasive Proce-
dures, 19 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 32, 33 (1989) [hereinafter Gostin, HIV-Infected Physiciansl
(estimating the possible risk of an HIV-positive surgeon infecting a patient to be in the range of
1 in 130,000 or I in 126, based upon the frequency of operations performed by the surgeon that
increases the cumulative risk of transmission).
215. Recommendations for Preventing Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus
and Hepatitis B Virus to Patients During Exposure-Prone Invasive Procedures, 40 MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT No. RR-8, i, 4 (July 12, 1991).
216. Gostin, HIV-Infected Physicians, supra note 214, at 33; see also Michael D. Hagan, et
al. Routine Preoperative Screening for HIV: Does the Risk to the Surgeon Outweigh the Risk to
the Patient?, 259 J. AM. MED. Assoc. 1357, 1358 (1988) (calculating the risk of HIV infection on
the basis of skin puncture rates for surgeons and extrapolating on the basis of the number of
invasive procedures performed).
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in the special context of the provision of medical care, the Council
believes that if a risk of transmission of an infectious disease from a
physician to a patient exists, disclosure of that risk to patients is not
enough; patients are entitled to expect that their physicians will not
increase their exposure to the risk of contracting an infectious
disease, even minimally. If no risk exists, disclosure of the
physician's medical condition to his or her patients will serve no
rational purpose; if a risk does exist, the physician should not engage
in the activity.
21 7
This recommendation parallels the specialized state statutes regarding
knowing transmission of HIV in that an ethical "duty" is imposed
upon a physician to refrain from activities that pose a risk of HIV
transmission to his or her patients. The Council additionally recom-
mended that an HIV-positive physician disclose his or her infection to
colleagues in order to discuss the prudence of continued practice and
the associated risk for his or her patients.2 18 The basis for extending
liability to physicians for knowing transmission of HIV through inva-
sive procedures was established through this recommendation. How-
ever, one essential component was absent-an enforcement provision.
B. Documented HIV Transmission from a Health Care Worker to
Five Patients
The effectiveness of self-enforcement and the imposition of an ethi-
cal duty for HIV-positive physicians to refrain from invasive proce-
dures was questioned in 1990 when the CDC reported that a twenty-
three-year-old woman had contracted HIV from her dentist.1 9 The
subsequent CDC investigation revealed that the dentist, Dr. David
Acer, was diagnosed with HIV infection in late 1986, and with AIDS
in September 1987.220 Kimberly Bergalis, the infected patient, had six
217. Ethical Issues Involved in the Growing AIDS Crisis, COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL
AFFAIRS, AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, 259 J. AM. MED. Assoc. 1360, 1361 (1988).
218. Id. One article criticized the disclosure recommendation as improvident "given the ac-
tual experiences of HIV-infected physicians, who after such disclosures, often found themselves
without employment." Mark Barnes, et al., The HIV-Infected Health Care Professional: Em-
ployment Policies and Public Health, 18 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 311, 315 (1990).
219. Lawrence K. Altman, U.S. Says Study Suggests Dentist Conveyed AIDS, N.Y. TIMES,
July 27, 1990, at Al (relating that the CDC reported "for the first time a health professional
with AIDS had transmitted the virus that causes the disease to a patient during a medical proce-
dure").
220. Carol Ciesielski, et al., Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus in a Dental
'Practice, 116 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 798, 801 (1992) (the AIDS diagnosis was based upon a
biopsy of his palate that indicated Kaposi's sarcoma and a depressed CD4+ lymphocyte count).
This article, from the Centers for Disease Control, Atlanta, Georgia, details the investigative
study of the possible modes of transmission from Dr. Acei to eight of his patients through DNA
analysis of his HIV strain compared to those of the infected patients. Id. at 798.
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dental visits with Dr. Acer between November 1987 and June 1989,
which included prophylactic cleanings, cosmetic bondings and a final
visit for extractions of her molars.22' Her medical records indicated
that four weeks after the extractions, she was treated by her family
physician for a sore throat and ulcerated tonsils. 22  In December 1989
she developed pneumocystis carinii pneumonia and was diagnosed
with AIDS. 23 In the course of the investigation, the CDC identified
four additional patients as being infected with a strain of HIV closely
related to that of Dr. Acer.224
The CDC team concluded that the preponderance of evidence sup-
ported a direct dentist-to-patient transmission as opposed to any other
alternative theory of transmission.225 However, the investigation failed
to identify the actual mode of transmission from Dr. Acer to his pa-
tients. The CDC report explained that if contaminated instruments or
equipment were assumed to be the primary transmission mechanism,
then one would expect to find an association between the appointment
dates and times of the infected patients, yet none were identified. 226
Interviews with Dr. Acer's staff indicated that instruments were
cleaned by methods known to kill HIV prior to use on any patients.
Although the dentist wore gloves during all patient procedures, the
possibility of experiencing accidental cuts in his hands while perform-
ing invasive procedures was heightened by the fact that Dr. Acer suf-
fered periods of fatigue and ill health during the infected patients'
visits.227
The CDC did not find substantial support for the hypothesis that
Dr. Acer intentionally transmitted HIV to his patients. 2 8 The investi-
221. Id. at 799. See Lawrence K. Altman, The Doctor's World; An AIDS Puzzle: What
Went Wrong in the Dentist's Office, N.Y. Times, July 30, 1991, at C3 (reporting that Kimberly
Bergalis was ihe first patient infected by Doctor Acer).
222. For a review of the general symptoms associated with initial infection with HIV, see
supra text accompanying notes 17-22.
223. Ciesielski, supra note 220, at 799.
224. Id. at 800. The CDC investigative team analyzed sections of DNA for any similarities
between Dr. Acer's HIV strain and those of eight of his infected patients. From this evaluation,
the CDC identified five patients as being infected with a strain of HIV closely related in structure
and sequence to Acer's HIV strain. Id.
225. Id. at 803.
226. Id.
227. Id. The report also explained that a survey of 89 dentists revealed that 32% reported
two or more cuts or sharp related injuries per month, and 30 experienced 15 injuries per month.
These raw statistics, coupled with the possibility of "peripheral nervous system dysfunction"
due to the progression of AIDS, provide some support for transmission from a wound on Dr.
Acer's hand and subsequent blood-to-inflamed-gum exposure. Id.
228. In 1993 the CDC confirmed that a sixth patient was infected by Dr. Acer. Update:
Investigations of Persons Treated by HIV-Infected Health-Care Workers-United States, 42
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gation showed that the dentist's staff observed most of the patients'
procedures, all of the patients were awake during their treatment, and
neither the staff nor the patients recalled any unusual behavior during
their visits.129 The CDC team surmised that the risk of transmission
from a health care worker to a patient during an invasive procedure
"may depend on several factors, including the type of procedure, the
infection control precautions, and the individual technique of the
health care worker. ' 230 Following the investigation, the CDC con-
cluded that the risk of contracting HIV from a health care worker
who adheres to recommended infection control precautions is still a
remote possibility that "should not deter patients from seeking neces-
sary surgical or dental care."
23'
Notwithstanding the CDC's conclusion, Kimberly Bergalis lobbied
to establish mandatory HIV testing for health care workers and full
disclosure regarding HIV status between physicians and patients. 232
Her efforts compelled the public and Congress to focus on the issue of
whether health care workers should be held to the same standard of
disclosure as an HIV-positive individual engaging in risk-related be-
havior. The fact that Dr. Acer's infection with HIV was reported to
the Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, but was
shielded by the state's confidentiality statute for sexually transmissible
diseases, 33 heightened the controversy over the balance between confi-
dentiality and a patient's right to know all of the risks associated with
an invasive procedure.
23 4
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. No. 17, 329 (May 7, 1993); see also David Kidwell,
AIDS Dentist's Lethal Weapon? Accidental Transmission Unlikely in Latest Case, Experts Say,
MIAJJI HERALD, June 6, 1993, at IA (identifying the sixth victim as eighteen-year-old Sherry
Johnson of Florida). Harold Jaffe, director of AIDS research at the CDC, commented that the
"report of the sixth patient has certainly raised more questions about the possibility of criminal
intent." Id. Also in 1992 a friend of Dr. Acer's opined that the physician had a "possible"
motive for intentionally inflicting his patients: "He was angry that America was ignoring AIDS
and once said, 'When it starts affecting grandmothers and younger people, then you'll see some-
thing done."'Id.
229. Ciesielski, supra note 220, at 803.
230. Id. at 804.
231. Id.; see also Barnes, supra note 218, at 323 (concluding that the risk of transmission
during invasive procedures performed by infected health-care workers is remote).
232. See 137 CoNo. REc. H.R. 5203, 5204 (daily ed. June 26, 1991)(Representative Burton of
Indiana read a quote from Barbara Webb, another patient infected by Dr. Acer, recognizing
Kimberly Bergalis as the "prime inspiration for mandatory testing" of health care workers).
233. See FLA. STAT. § 384.29 (1990) (providing that "[a]ll information and records held by
the department [HRS] or its authorized representatives relating to known or suspected cases of
sexually transmissible diseases shall be strictly confidential"); see also FLA. STAT. § 384.23
(1990)(defining sexually transmissible diseases to include the human immunodeficiency virus).
234. See 'I Blame ... Every Single One of You,' Dying Florida Woman with AIDS Faults
Dentist, Agency in Letter, WASH. POST., June 22, 1991, at A3 (publishing a letter from Kimberly
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C. Congressional Response to Health Care Worker Transmission of
HIV
During the 1991 legislative sessions in the U.S. Congress, numerous
congressional enactments were proposed in reaction to the documen-
tation of actual transmission of HIV in the health care setting. The
proposed legislation ranged in severity from advocating criminal sanc-
tions for knowingly exposing patients to HIV,2"5 to mandatory testing
for all health care workers and disclosure of positive test results to
patients,23 6 to mandating state compliance with CDC recommenda-
tions to minimize the possibility of HIV transmission .2 1 Senators and
representatives emphasized the need for enhanced accountability by
health care professionals beyond the existing ethical duty to individu-
ally determine when their HIV-positive status becomes a threat to
their patients.
238
The most stringent proposal, offered by Senator Helms of North
Carolina, sought to impose criminal sanctions upon any HIV-positive
health care worker who, with knowledge of his or her HIV infection,
performed invasive medical procedures without prior disclosure of
Bergalis to an investigator at the Florida Department of HRS in which Ms. Bergalis stated:
"Anyone who knew Dr. Acer was infected and had full-blown AIDS and stood by not doing a
damn thing about it. You are all just as guilty as he was."); see also Barbara Kantrowtiz, et al.,
Doctors and AIDS, NEWSWEEK, July 1, 1991, at 49. This article includes an interview with Bar-
bara Webb, another patient who was infected by Dr. Acer. Ms. Webb explained that earlier in
1992 when eye surgery was recommended by her physician, she informed him of her HIV-posi-
tive status and told him she would not be insulted if he refused to perform the operation. Id. She
was prepared to go to an AIDS clinic in the event he refused, explaining: "And it wouldn't have
bothered me at all to go down. I just gave him the option. Nobody gave me the option." Id.
Only two years after the onset of AIDS from her exposure to Dr. Acer, Kimberly Bergalis died
on December 8, 1991. See Warren E. Leary, A.M.A. Backs Off on an AIDS Risk List, N.Y.
TIMEs, Dec. 15, 1991, at 1.
235. 137 CONG. REC. S9776-78 (daily ed. July 11, 1991)(amendment 734 to an appropriations
bill, sponsored by Republican Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina). This amendment was
subsequently deleted from the final bill, H.R. REP. No. 234, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., at 37-8
(1991).
236. 137 CONG. REc. E2376, E2377 (daily ed. June 6, 1991)(proposed bill offered by Repre-
sentative William E. Dannemeyer, Democrat, California).
237. Treasury, Postal Service and General Government Appropriations Act of 1992, Pub. L.
No. 102-141, s. 633, 105 Stat. 834, 867-77 (1991)(initially sponsored by Republican Senator Rob-
ert Dole of Kansas). For a detailed analysis of these proposals, see Jeffery W. Cavender, AIDS
in the Health Care Setting: The Congressional Response to the Kimberly Bergalis Case, 26 GA.
L. REV. 539 (1992).
238. See, e.g., 137 CONG. REc. S10331, 10349 (daily ed. July 11, 1991)(Democratic Senator
Ted Kennedy of Massachusetts, advocating strict adherence by health care workers to universal
precautions and to uniform national standards for infection control as the best method to pro-
tect against HIV transmission); 137 CoNG. REc. H5203, 5207 (daily ed. June 26,
1991)(Democratic Representative Burton of Indiana stating that Dr. Acer must have known he
was violating the tenets of the Hippocratic Oath when he exposed his patients to HIV).
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this condition to the patient. 39 The proposed penalty was a fine of not
more than $10,000, or imprisonment for a minimum of ten years, or
both.2 40 The purpose of this legislation was analogous to the special-
ized statutes enacted by many states: to punish infected health care
workers who "recklessly provide medical treatment to unknowing pa-
tients without informing them" of the possibility of exposure to
HIV. 241
As an alternative to criminal liability, Representative Dannemeyer
of California sponsored a bill entitled "The Kimberly Bergalis Patient
and Health Care Providers Protection Act of 1991.1 241 The proposal
called for mandatory HIV testing of health care workers who perform
procedures identified by the Secretary of Health and Human Services
as posing a risk of HIV or other specified communicable disease
transmission from a health care worker to a patient. 24 Any health
care worker who tested positive for HIV would be prohibited from
performing the listed procedures unless the worker informed the pa-
tient of the worker's HIV-positive status, the risk of transmission as-
sociated with the indicated procedure, and obtained the written
consent of the patient. 24 Reciprocal provisions provided for HIV test-
ing of patients scheduled to receive the same listed procedures.
Contemporaneous to these proposals, the CDC, on July 12, 1991,
issued comprehensive guidelines for the prevention of HIV transmis-
sion.1f45 The CDC stressed compliance with universal precautions and
recommended that health care workers with skin lesions or weeping
dermatitis should refrain from all direct patient contact. 246 The CDC
advocated that health care providers and professional organizations
identify exposure-prone procedures that would subsequently consti-
tute the basis for practice restrictions of infected health care work-
ers.2 47 The recommendations stressed that professionals who perform
invasive procedures should seek HIV testing and health care workers
239. 137 CONG. REc. S9776, S9778 (daily ed. July 11, 1991).
240. Id.
241. Id. at S9786 (statement by Republican Senator Strom Thurmond of South Carolina,
subsequent cosponsor of Amendment 734).
242. 137 CONG. REC. H5203 (daily ed. June 26, 1991).
243. 137 CONG. REC. E2376, E2376-77 (daily ed. June 26, 1991).
244. Id. at E2377.
245. Recommendations for Preventing Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus
and Hepatitis B Virus to Patients During Exposure-Prone Invasive Procedures, 40 MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. No. RR-8, 1, 5 (July 12, 1991).
246. Id.
247. Id. The CDC also defined exposure-prone procedures as those that involve "digital pal-
pation of a needle tip in a body cavity or the simultaneous presence of the HCW's [health care
worker's) fingers and a needle or other sharp instrument or object in a poorly visualized or
highly confined anatomic site." Id. at 4.
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who know that they are HIV-positive should either refrain from expo-
syre-prone procedures, or inform patients of their HIV-positive status
prior to performing such procedures. 24 Through an amendment, of-
fered by Senator Dole of Kansas, states would be required to adopt
the 1991 CDC guidelines, as well as any prospective recommenda-
tions, and enforce compliance by health care workers through discipli-
nary actions under state licensure authority .249
The final enactment, Section 633 of the Treasury, Postal Service
and General Government Appropriations Act of 1992210 required each
State Public Health Official to certify adoption of either the CDC
guidelines or equivalent provisions to the Secretary of Health and Hu-
man Services within one year after the date of the enactment."5 ' This
section also contained enforcement provisions applicable to health
care workers and the states:
State guidelines shall apply to health professionals practicing within
the State and shall be consistent with Federal law. Compliance with
such guidelines shall be the responsibility of the State Public Health
Official. Said responsibilities shall include a process for determining
what appropriate disciplinary or other actions shall be taken to
ensure compliance. If such certification is not provided under this
section within the one-year period, the State shall be ineligible to
receive assistance under the Public Health Service Act. 2f
The enactment represented a compromise between the imposition of
criminal penalties for knowing transmission of HIV and the self-en-
forcement policy adopted by the American Medical Association in
1988.253 The CDC guidelines would also define prohibited conduct for
HIV-positive health care workers through the development of a re-
stricted list of exposure-prone procedures. Thus, a medical duty to re-
frain from such procedures would be imposed on infected health care
professionals through independent enforcement provisions adopted in
each state.
248. Id.
249. 137 CoiqG. kc. S10331, S10348-50 (daily ed. July 18, 1991) (offered as Amendment
No. 781 to an appropriations bill).
250. Public L. No. 102-141, § 633, 105 Stat. 834, 876-77 (1991) (enacted into law Oct. 28,
1991). On December 22, 1992, the Assistant Secretary of Health and Human Services delegated
to the Director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention all of the authority vested in
the Assistant Secretary under Public Law No. 102-141 which excluded "the authority to promul-
gate regulations and to submit reports to Congress." Public Health Service, Delegation of Au-
thority, 58 Fed. Reg. 578 (Jan. 6, 1993).
251. § 633, 105 Stat. at 876.
252. Id.
253. See supra text accompanying notes 217-18.
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However, the foundation for establishing this medical duty-a list
of exposure-prone procedures-never materialized, due to the unex-
pected refusal of health care organizations to identify procedures that
constitute a high risk of HIV transmission.254 Instead, the American
Medical Association, the American Dental Association, and the Assis-
tant Secretary of Health and Human Services advocated the need for
additional research to accurately assess the risk of HIV transmis-
sion.25 Consequently, the CDC receded from the exposure-prone list
and provided direction for state health departments to establish their
own policies and restrictions for HIV-infected health care profession-
als. 256 Beyond the federal requirement to implement either the CDC
guidelines or equivalent provisions, the medical duty to refrain from
risk related procedures or disclose one's HIV-positive status to pro-
spective patients remained an ethical requirement subject to regula-
tions developed by the individual states.
D. State Courts Recognizing a Medical Duty to Disclose or Refrain
from Practice
Although many state legislatures have proposed bills to ensure
safety in the delivery of health care services by HIV-positive profes-
sionals, 257 state court decisions have established precedents for up-
holding the patient's interest in knowing the HIV status of a health
care worker. A brief discussion of several state court decisions demon-
strates that in the absence of an established list of exposure-prone pro-
cedures, state courts are assessing the inherent risk of HIV
transmission in specific medical situations and the resultant duty of
health care professionals to refrain from knowingly placing a patient
at risk of contracting HIV. A duty to inform both prospective and
prior patients of the possibility of HIV exposure is imposed when an
HIV-positive health care worker knows of his or her infection and
practices in an area involving invasive surgical procedures.
254. Lawrence K. Altman, Unexpected Defiance Greets AIDS Guidelines, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
15, 1991, at C3.
255. Id.; see also Warren E. Leary, A.M.A. Backs Off on an AIDS Risk List, N.Y. TiMES,
Dec. 15, 1991, § 1, at 38 (reporting that the basis for rejecting the implementation of an expo-
sure-prone list was the lack of scientific justification for such a measure).
256. Lawrence K. Altman, U.S. to Let States Set Rules on AIDS-Infected Health Workers,
N.Y. TIMEs, June 16, 1992, at C7.
257. See Donald H.J. Hermann, State Legislatures Consider Bills Dealing With HIV-In-
fected Health Care Providers in Face of CDC Inaction, 24 J. HEAIrH & Hosp. LAW 215 (July
1991)(discussing bills under consideration in several states on the issue of mandatory HIV test-
ing, disclosure of HIV-positive status, and practice restrictions for health care professionals).
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I. New Jersey: Duty to Disclose Physician's HIV Status to
Prospective Patients
In Estate of Behringer v. Princeton Medical Center,2 8 the New Jer-
sey Superior Court upheld the medical center's policy requiring an
HIV-positive surgeon to inform patients of his infection prior to per-
forming any type of invasive surgical procedure. In this case, the
plaintiff was a board-certified ENT (ear-nose-throat) specialist and a
plastic surgeon who contracted AIDS in June 1987.259 Following his
diagnosis, the medical center suspended the plaintiff's surgical privi-
leges pending a review of the restrictions that would be imposed on his
practice. After consideration of the CDC guidelines advocating an ad
hoc assessment for restricting the continued practice of infected health
care workers,W° the medical center board of trustees required the use
of a special informed consent verification for any patient scheduled to
undergo an invasive procedure by an HIV-positive surgeon. Adhering
to the recommendations of the American Medical Association
(AMA), the medical center adopted an additional policy providing
that a "physician or health care provider with known HIV seroposi-
tivity may continue to treat patients at The Medical Center at Prince-
ton, but shall not perform procedures that pose any risk of HIV
transmission to the patient." '26' As a result of the informed consent
requirement and his "potential risk" for transmitting HIV, the plain-
tiff never performed surgery at the medical center following his diag-
nosis with AIDS.
2 62
In assessing the validity of the medical center's policies restricting
the practice of the plaintiff, the court stated that the discontinuation
of his surgical procedures must be based upon a "reasonable proba-
bility of substantial harm" as well as a "materially enhanced risk of
serious injury" to patients. 263 The plaintiff argued that the risk of
258. 592 A.2d 1251, 1283 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991).
259. Id. at 1254. Behringer's estate filed suit against Princeton Medical Center for breach of
confidentiality regarding the surgeon's infection with HIV and violation of New Jersey law due
to the imposition of conditions on the surgeon's performance of surgical procedures and subse-
quent recovation of all surgical privileges. Id. For the purposes of this Comment, the discussion
of this case focuses upon the latter claim concerning the medical center's requirement that the
surgeon obtain the informed consent of any prospective surgical patient acknowledging that the
patient was informed of the surgeon's HIV infection and agreed to undergo the indicated surgery
after receiving this information. Id. at 1258-59. Also, the discussion of this case will refer to the
plaintiff as William H. Behringer, rather than his estate.
260. Id. at 1257-58; see supra text accompanying notes 211-13.
261. Behringer, 592 A.2d at 1260 (emphasis in original); see supra text accompanying notes
217-18.
262. Behringer, 592 A.2d at 1260.
263. Id. at 1276.
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HIV transmission from an infected surgeon to a patient is too remote
to impose practice restrictions or an informed consent requirement
prior to the performance of surgical procedures.2 6 Rather than con-
centrating solely upon the risk of transmission, the court recognized
that the additional risk of a surgical accident, such as "a needle-stick
or scalpel cut, during surgery performed by an HIV-positive surgeon,
may subject a previously uninfected patient to months or even years
of continual HIV testing. ' 26 Therefore, the combination of the risk
of transmission and the risk of surgical accident constituted a reasona-
ble probability of substantial harm and an enhanced risk of injury to
a patient under these circumstances.
26
The court summarized the justification for upholding an informed
consent requirement for patients of an HIV-positive surgeon:
If there is to be an ultimate arbiter of whether the patient is to be
treated invasively by an AIDS-positive surgeon, the arbiter will be
the fully-informed patient. The ultimate risk to the patient is so
absolute-so devastating-that it is untenable to argue against
informed consent combined with a restriction on procedures which
present "any risk" to the patient.2 67
The court held that the medical center's policies were proper due to
the thorough investigation undertaken prior to the imposition of the
practice restrictions and the informed consent requirement, even
though these actions resulted in the discontinuation of the plaintiff's
surgical practice.
268
The decision in Behringer extends the duty to refrain from knowing
transmission of HIV to health care workers in the context of invasive
surgical procedures. 269 The court recognized that AIDS is a fatal dis-
264. Id. at 1279. For an in-depth discussion of all the factors that should be considered in a
decision to restrict an HIV-positive physician's practice, see Barnes, supra note 218, at 323-24.
265. Behringer, 592 A.2d at 1279.
266. Id. The court rejected expert medical testimony that emphasized that the statistical risk
of transmission from an infected health care worker to patient was remote on the basis that the
"cumulative risk" of transmission to surgical patients increases as the surgeon performs more
operations. Id. at 1279-80 (citing Lawrence Gostin, HIV-Infected Physicians and the Practice of
Seriously Invasive Procedures, 19 HAsTINGS CENTER REP. 32, 33 (1989)).
267. Id. at 1283.
268. Id.
269. The nature of the health care worker's job performance is also an essential factor in
cases involving claims against employers for discrimination on the basis of an individual's HIV
status. See, e.g., In re Westchester County Medical Center, U.S. Dept. of Health and Human
Services, Departmental App. Bd., No. 1357, Dkt. No. 91-504-2 (Jan. 11, 1993) (finding that the
imposed restrictions on an HIV-positive pharmacist to discontinue the preparation of intrave-
nous medications by the medical center constituted discrimination due to the lack of any signifi-
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ease and exposure to HIV by any mode of transmission results in test-
ing for at least one year after an individual comes in contact with the
virus. 7 0 Although the risk of transmission from an HIV-positive sur-
geon to a patient is remote during an invasive procedure, the conse-
quence of a surgical accident places the patient at an unknown risk
which, in the opinion of the court, is unacceptable.2 7 ' By balancing the
patient's interest in knowing all of the risks associated with a medi-
cally indicated procedure against the surgeon's interest in continuing
to practice invasive surgery, the court concluded that the "patient's
rights must prevail." 272 New Jersey's strong policy supporting patient
rights was a primary factor in the court's decision. However, the rea-
soning employed also illustrates an assessment and subsequent en-
forcement of both the CDC and the AMA recommendations for
infected health care workers.
2. Pennsylvania: Duty to Notify Prior Patients of Physician's
HI V Status
The Pennsylvania Superior Court recognized the duty to disclose a
physician's HIV-positive status to prior surgical patients in order to
test, counsel and treat any affected individuals in In re Milton S. Her-
shey Medical Center.2 73 In this case, a physician, practicing in obstet-
rics and gynecology in a joint residency at two local hospitals,
sustained a cut in his surgical glove during an invasive operation,
thereby exposing a patient to his blood.2 7 4 After voluntarily submitting
cant risk of transmission associated with the prohibited procedures); see also Melinda
Henneberger, Pharmacist with H.L V. A warded Job, N.Y. Tiars, Jan. 12, 1993 at B5 (reporting
that the Westchester County Medical Center reached a settlement agreement with the pharmacist
and offered him a job free of any work restrictions).
270. Behringer, 592 A.2d at 1280 (emphasizing that testing a patient for HIV after a surgical
accident involving an HIV-positive surgeon imposes anxiety during the wait for test results, "and
the possible alterations to life style and child-bearing during the testing period, even if those
results ultimately are negative").
271. Id. The duty to disclose was also recognized in Leckelt v. Board of Commissioners of
Hospital District No. 1, 909 F.2d 820 (5th Cir. 1990), where the court upheld the hospital's
employment decision to terminate a licensed practical nurse for his persistent failure to provide
his HIV test results to the hospital's infection control practitioner. The court stated that the
hospital's "strong interests in maintaining a safe workplace through infection control out-
weighed the limited intrusion on any privacy interest of Leckelt in the results of his HIV anti-
body test." Id. at 833. For an analysis of the ramifications of the Leckelt decision, see L.A.
Vash, Leckelt v. Board of Commissioners of Hospital District No. 1: Forced Disclosure for HIV
Infected Health Care Workers, 65 TutL. L. REv. 1722 (1991).
272. Behringer, 592 A.2d at 1283. See also Gostin, HIV-Infected Physicians, supra note 214,
at 36 (advocating that "a physician who knows, or ought to know, that he or she is HIV-posi-
tive, should voluntarily refrain from practicing seriously invasive procedures").
273. 595 A.2d 1290 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991), aff'd, 634 A.2d 159 (Pa. 1993).
274. Id. at 1291.
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to testing the next day, the physician tested positive for HIV. The
physician then informed the appropriate individuals at both hospitals
and undertook a leave of absence due to his diagnosis. 275 After identi-
fying the number of patients treated by the physician during his joint
residency, both hospitals filed petitions seeking to disclose informa-
tion regarding the physician's HIV infection to prior patients and spe-
cific staff members 276
The issue on appeal was whether the trial court abused its discretion
or violated the State's Confidentiality of HIV-Related Information
Act by granting the hospitals' petitions for limited disclosure of the
physician's HIV status.2 77 The Superior Court of Pennsylvania stated
that the purpose of the Confidentiality Act was to promote voluntary
HIV testing and to impose stringent exceptions for disclosure of the
subsequent test results. 278 The statute provided an exception for disclo-
sure of an individual's HIV status only upon the demonstration of a
"compelling need" before a court.27 9 The physician argued that such a
need was not demonstrated by the hospitals under the facts of the
case. Furthermore, the physician asserted that an affirmance of the
disclosure order would not only discourage other health care profes-
sionals from seeking voluntary HIV testing, but also would impose
liability on all hospitals if they fail to follow the same disclosure stan-
dard in similar situations.280
In assessing these arguments, the court recognized the physician's
right to privacy, but explained that the public health interest in com-
batting the spread of AIDS must prevail:
Without question, one's health problems are a private matter to be
dealt with by the individual in the way s/he feels most comfortable
and sees fit. However, Dr. Doe's medical problem was not merely
his. It became a public concern the moment he picked up a surgical
instrument and became part of a team involved in invasive
procedures.28 '
The court upheld the disclosure order on the basis of the invasive na-
ture of the procedures performed by the physician and the possibility
275. Id. at 1292.
276. Id. at 1293. The Hershey Medical Center identified 279 patients treated by the resident,
referred to as Dr. Doe in the court's opinion, in addition to the 168 patients treated at the
Harrisburg Hospital during his joint residency. Id. at 1292.
277. Id. at 1294.
278. Id. at 1295.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 1295-96.
281. Id. at 1298 (emphasis in original).
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of infected patients inadvertently transmitting HIV to other unsus-
pecting individuals as a result of nondisclosure in this case.112 The
court concluded that the order contained sufficient restrictions on the
disclosure of the name of the physician to ensure the optimum degree
of confidentiality by allowing the hospitals to notify patients about
the HIV-positive status of a "resident physician" in order to offer the
opportunity for counseling and HIV testing.
23
3. Maryland: Negligent Failure to Warn Patients of a Physician's
HIV Status
In Faya v. Almaraz,28 the Maryland Court of Appeals held that the
plaintiffs pled sufficient facts to establish a cause of action in negli-
gence against a surgeon diagnosed with AIDS and the hospital in
which he practiced for failure to warn the plaintiffs of his infection
prior to their surgical operations. The defendant, an oncology surgeon
specializing in breast cancer, tested HIV-positive in 1986 and per-
formed a partial mastectomy on plaintiff Faya in October 1988. In
October of the following year, the defendant was diagnosed with
AIDS on the basis of an opportunistic eye infection. 21 One month
after receiving his AIDS diagnosis, he operated on plaintiff Rossi to
remove a benign lump from her breast. Both plaintiffs learned of their
physician's HIV infection from a local newspaper after he died of
AIDS in November 1990.296
The plaintiffs filed separate suits claiming negligence on the part of
the physician. The trial court dismissed both cases due to the fact that
the plaintiffs tested HIV-negative after learning of the physician's
AIDS diagnosis; neither complaint pled sufficient allegations of expo-
sure to HIV; and the damages asserted were based upon unsubstan-
tiated fears of contracting HIV as demonstrated by their negative
status for more than six months. 287 The Maryland Court of Appeals
282. Id. at 1300, 1302.
283. Id. at 1301; see also Gordon G. Keyes, Health-Care Professionals with AIDS: The Risk
of Transmission Balanced Against the Interests of Professionals and Institutions, 16 J.C. & U.L.
589 (1990)(discussing the alternatives for hospitals and medical teaching institutions to protect
patients from the risk of acquiring HIV during invasive procedures performed by infected health
care workers).
284. 620 A.2d 327 (Md. 1993). This cases involves the consolidation of two cases, Faya v.
Almaraz, No. 90-345011, 1991 WL 317023 (Md. Cir. Ct. 1991), and Rossi v. Almaraz, No. 90-
344028, 1991 WL 166924 (Md. Cir. Ct. 1991). The plaintiffs, Sonja Faya and Perry Mahoney
Rossi, were both former patients of Dr. Almaraz, who subsequently died of AIDS prior to the
litigation. 620 A.2d at 329.
285. Almaraz, 620 A.2d at 329.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 330-31.
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explained that in order to reverse the dismissal of the plaintiffs'
claims, the record must reveal that the defendant breached a recog-
nized duty of care which proximately caused a legally compensable
injury. 288 Based on the facts of this case, the court found that it was
foreseeable that the defendant could transmit HIV to his patients dur-
ing invasive surgery, thus alleging the basis for a duty of care to either
refrain from performing such procedures or to inform surgical pa-
tients of his infection.
28 9
The court then addressed whether the plaintiffs' fear of contracting
HIV, resulting in multiple psychological symptoms and distress, con-
stituted a legally recognized injury.2 9° After reviewing several decisions
from other states, the court held that the plaintiffs' alleged fear of
acquiring HIV was not "initially unreasonable, as a matter of law,
even though the averments of the complaints did not identify any ac-
tual channel of transmission. ' 29' Therefore, the court concluded that
the plaintiffs could recover damages only for the period of "reasona-
ble" anxiety commencing with their discovery of the physician's AIDS
diagnosis and ending upon their receipt of negative test results for
HIV. 292 After finding sufficient allegations to reverse the dismissal of
their claims, the court also concluded that these facts supported a
cause of action in negligence against the hospital in which the defen-
dant had operating privileges on the basis of vicarious liability and
agency principles.
293
Although the final disposition of Almaraz is pending, the decision
of the Maryland Court of Appeals recognizes the duty of a health care
professional infected with HIV to either refrain from invasive proce-
dures or disclose this condition to prospective patients at risk of con-
tracting the virus. In explaining the basis for this duty, the court
referred to the policy statements of the AMA advocating that an HIV-
positive health care worker should either "'refrain from doing proce-
dures that pose a significant risk of HIV transmission or perform
these procedures only with the consent of the patient and the permis-
288. Id. at 333. For an in-depth analysis of potential liability for negligent transmission of
HIV from a health care worker to a patient under Florida case law, see Diane A. Tomlinson,
Physicians with AIDS and Their Duty to Patients, 43 FLA. L. REV. 561 (1991).
289. Almaraz, 620 A.2d at 334.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 336-37.
292. Id. at 337.
293. Almaraz, 620 A.2d at 339; see also Keyes, supra note 283, at 611-12 (discussing the
possible liability of health care institutions for failing to either restrict the duties of HIV-positive
professionals or impose an informed consent requirement).
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sion of a local review committee. ' '2 94 The decision in Almaraz dem-
onstrates that although guidelines and recommendations of medical
organizations are not controlling, courts will refer to these guidelines
when confronted with the difficult task of analyzing the actions of a
HIV-positive health care worker in these situations.
The decisions in Almaraz, In re Hershey Medical Center and Beh-
ringer support a duty to disclose the HIV-positive status of a physi-
cian in the context of invasive procedures. In each case, the court
assessed the nature of the physician's practice, the associated risk of
HIV transmission to patients, and the expectation of the patient to
avoid foreseeable complications from the indicated procedure. Be-
cause medical organizations refrained from identifying exposure-
prone procedures, state courts assumed the role of assessing whether a
substantial risk of harm or injury was inherent in a specific medical
procedure to warrant either the disclosure of the physician's HIV-pos-
itive status or the imposition of practice restrictions. Consequently,
prudent health care decisions regarding the continued practice of an
HIV-positive surgeon should include a consideration of the patient's
perception of the risk of HIV exposure during an invasive procedure.
This trilogy of state court cases provides a foundation for other states
to extend the duty to refrain from knowing transmission of HIV to
the health care setting.
VII. CONCLUSION
Court decisions and specialized statutes impose liability for know-
ing transmission of HIV, whether in the context of individual risk-
related conduct or the delivery of health care services, because a per-
son who knows of his or her HIV-positive status can minimize the risk
of transmitting HIV to others through responsible conduct. Johnson
v. West Virginia University Hospitals2 95 provides an example of the
extreme cost of failing to minimize the risk of HIV transmission in the
health care setting. In Johnson, hospital emergency room personnel
summoned a security officer to subdue a combative AIDS patient, but
failed to post an infectious disease sign outside the patient's room or
to verbally warn the officer of the patient's diagnosis. 2" With blood in
and around his mouth from a prior self-inflicted bite, the patient pro-
ceeded to bite and break the skin of the officer's arm, causing signifi-
294. Almaraz, 620 A.2d at 334 (quoting from American Medical Association, DIsST OF
HIV/AIDS POLICY, (Sept. 14, 1992)).
295. 413 S.E.2d 889 (W. Va. 1991).
296. Id. at 891.
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cant bleeding. 297 The security officer filed suit against the hospital for
negligent failure to warn him of the patient's AIDS diagnosis and his
subsequent emotional distress, resulting in a jury verdict of $1.9 mil-
lion.
291
On appeal, the court explained that a cause of action for emotional
distress due to fear of contracting AIDS must include evidence of ac-
tual exposure to the disease. 299 The court concluded that there "is no
dispute that the AIDS-infected blood of the patient came into contact
with the blood of the appellee."' 3 In upholding the jury verdict, the
court emphasized that the hospital's policy of posting warning signs to
alert individuals of a patient's infectious disease "clearly" established
the basis for a negligent failure to warn the appellee."' Although the
failure to warn involved a third party in Johnson, the facts do not
differ significantly from a scenario in which a patient undergoes an
invasive procedure and later discovers that the surgeon was HIV-posi-
tive. Just as the hospital's policy of posting warning signs established
the basis for a duty to warn, the guidelines of the Centers for Disease
Control and the American Medical Association establish the basis for
an HIV-positive health care worker to refrain from exposure-prone
procedures or perform such procedures only after obtaining the in-
formed consent of the patient.302 It is not illogical to hypothesize that
similar compensation may occur in a future case based on a claim that
a health care worker failed to inform a patient of his or her HIV-
positive status prior to performing an exposure-prone procedure.
Although the risk of transmission from an HIV-positive health care
worker to a patient during an invasive procedure is statistically re-
mote,303 a 1991 Gallup poll of 618 adults revealed that 95% of the
survey group believed HIV-positive surgeons should be required to in-
form patients of their infection prior to treatment. 304 Moreover, the
297. Id.
298. Id. at 892.
299. Id. at 893.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. See supra notes 208-218, and accompanying text.
303. See supra text accompanying notes 214-16. Additionally, the CDC reported only one
patient as testing HIV-positive out of numerous patients treated by a general surgeon, a surgical
resident, and dental student, all of whom were HIV-positive and performed invasive procedures.
For a review of the actual statistics for each health care professional in the study, see Recom-
mendations for Preventing Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus and Hepatitis B
Virus to Patients During Exposure-Prone Invasive Procedures, 40 MORIDITY & MORTALITY
WEEKLY REP. No. RR-8, 1, 3-4 (July 12, 1991).
304. Kantrowtiz, supra note 234, at 49. The Gallup organization conducted the survey by
telephone with a margin of error of plus or minus five percent. Id. The survey also showed that
90% of the survey group believed all health care workers should inform patients of their HIV-
status and 97% favored reciprocal disclosure by patients. Id.
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CDC's investigation of the David Acer case did not instill public con-
fidence in the remote possibility of contracting HIV from infected
health care workers, but rather emphasized the uncertainty regarding
the actual mode of HIV transmission from the dentist to his pa-
tients.3 °0 Newspaper reports of physicians who continue to practice
with knowledge that they are HIV-positive or diagnosed with AIDS,
evoke public outrage and astonishment that a person dedicated to
treating patients would knowingly place those same people at an un-
suspected risk of contracting the virus.3°6 These sentiments evidence an
irrational fear when compared to the remote possibility of transmis-
sion in a treatment setting, yet they also indicate a general expectation
for educated medical professionals to act responsibly in a public
health crisis.
Perhaps the hospitals' responses in Behringer and In re Hershey
Medical Center will become the standard for "responsible" conduct
in deciding whether to impose practice restrictions, informed consent
requirements, or disclosure of a health care worker's HIV status. The
law in this area is evolving with the same emphasis on knowledge of
one's HIV infection and minimizing the risk of exposing unsuspecting
individuals to HIV as with the specialized state statutes that prohibit
knowing transmission during sexual and other types of conduct. Mili-
tary and civilian prosecutions under traditional criminal law theories
and specialized statutes evidence a consistent public interest in deter-
ring the knowing, and thereby avoidable, transmission of the virus.
Whether imposed by medical organizations, state legislatures, or the
judiciary, the duty to disclose or refrain from risk-related conduct is
being extended to HIV-positive health care professionals who perform
invasive procedures in order to prevent "knowing" transmission of
HIV tnder any circumstances.
305. See supra notes 219-234, and accompanying text.
306. Kantrowtiz, supra note 234, at 49 (reporting that a Minneapolis pediatrician infected
with HIV continued to perform deliveries and vaginal examinations with "weeping lesions" on
his hands and arms); see also George Hackett and Daniel Shapiro, I Want Him Crucified',
NEWSWEEK, Oct. 5, 1987, at 36 (reporting the reaction of a Houston woman after learning that
her children's pediatrician was HIV-positive: "I want him crucified . . . I really don't care if it
ruins his practice; I don't want him to go somewhere else to treat other little babies").
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